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This dissertation explores the relationship between financial intermediaries
and the macroeconomy, both internationally and domestically. The dissertation is
composed of two chapters, which study the role of financial sectors in international
finance and the US economy, respectively.
In the first chapter, I build a two-country two-goods open economy model with
asymmetric financial development levels to jointly match two puzzling observations
during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC): (1) the real consumption growth de-
clined more in foreign countries than in the US although the crisis broke out in
the US; (2) the US dollar appreciated against foreign currencies despite the sharp
net foreign asset position (NFA) deterioration in the US. The key innovation is to
introduce a milder financial constraint in the US within an international context.
In tranquil times, the US holds more risky assets due to its more advanced financial
market and consequently is more exposed to risks. When a crisis unfolds, the US
financial intermediaries suffer heavier capital losses and are forced to liquidate risky
asset holdings to deleverage. This deleveraging process leads to a capital retrench-
ment in the US, which will smooth the US consumption, raise the relative demand
of US goods, push up the domestic price index, and lead to a US dollar apprecia-
tion. Meanwhile, the NFA deterioration in the US is mainly due to the valuation
effect rather than the transaction effect. I show that the valuation effect does not
affect the contemporaneous relative consumption between countries, a fact that has
been overlooked in the literature. I then verify the model predictions in the data
covering major countries from 2003 to 2018. The empirical evidence echoes the the-
oretical predictions: (1) The US financial sector net worth plunged more than its
foreign counterparts and there was a large capital retrenchment in the US during
the GFC. (2) The US capital retrenchment had a significant negative impact on
foreign countries’ consumption and currency value.
In the second chapter, I identify a series of credit supply shocks in the US since
the 1970s using sign restriction VAR and apply the identified shock to firm-level data
using the panel local projection method. I document two main findings. First, the
identified credit supply shock has a significant and persistent impact on firm in-
vestment. One unit of a credit supply shock (0.39% movement of credit volume)
induces over 1% movement of firm investment on average at the peak. Different
from monetary policy shocks, the credit supply shock has medium- and long-term
effects on real variables. Second, the heterogeneous responses of firm investment to
the credit supply shock conditional on firm default risk are state-dependent. Firms
with lower default risk will increase investment more relative to average firms dur-
ing credit expansions, and contract investment less during credit contractions. Low
default risk firms have consistently lower borrowing costs and better access to ex-
ternal financing over credit cycles. This state-dependence of heterogeneous effects
also holds for firms that are large, mature, and less volatile. The second finding has
important implications for both empirical and theoretical studies in the future. On
the empirical side, it suggests a possibility of misspecification when assuming the
effects of firm characteristics on firm activity to exogenous shocks are invariant in
expansionary and contractionary phases. This paper highlights that the effects of
firm characteristics on firm investment to credit supply shocks have flipped signs and
commensurate magnitudes during credit expansions and contractions. On the theo-
retical side, the evidence is consistent with the insights of financial friction literature
arguing that financially constrained firms will be more negatively impacted during
credit contractions. Nevertheless, it also suggests that this effect is nonlinear and
state-dependent, i.e., financial frictions will amplify the effects of negative shocks,
but dampen the effects of positive shocks. A future model featuring credit cycles
and heterogeneous financial frictions should take this observation into account.
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Chapter 1: Consumption, Exchange Rate, and External Adjustment
in a Crisis
1.1 Introduction
A domestic housing slump that originated in the US turned into a global fi-
nancial crisis (GFC) in 2008. During this global economic meltdown, we observe
two puzzling facts: first, the real consumption growth declined more in foreign
countries than in the US, even though the crisis broke out in the US; second, the
US dollar appreciated against foreign currencies despite the sharp net foreign asset
position (NFA) deterioration in the US. This paper builds a two-country open econ-
omy model with asymmetric financial development levels, studies the interactions
between financial intermediaries across countries during the GFC, and generates
global risk-sharing, exchange rate, and external account dynamics that are consis-
tent with the two observations.
Figure 1.1 shows the global real consumption growth, real exchange rate, and
the US NFA during the GFC.1 The country sample is divided into two groups: the
1The data sample includes 10 advanced economies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) and 6 emerging economies
(Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico). These are the countries that have bilateral
international investment position and transaction data vis-à-vis the US available from BEA.
1
Note: This figure displays the global real consumption growth, real exchange rate, and the US NFA
during the GFC. Real consumption growth is the year-on-year log-difference of real consumption
and averaged for the RoW. The real exchange rate is logged and averaged for the RoW weighted
by bilateral trade volume with the US. Both series are normalized to zero in 2007Q4. The US
NFA is scaled by nominal GDP. This figure shows that the US real consumption growth declined
less than the RoW during the GFC although the crisis originated in the US, and the US dollar
appreciated against foreign currencies despite the sharp NFA deterioration in the US.
Figure 1.1: Puzzling Facts During the Global Financial Crisis
US and the rest of the world (RoW).2 The RoW real consumption growth is the
average across countries other than the US, and the real exchange rate is weighted
by bilateral trade volume with the US.3 The real exchange rate is denoted as the
US dollar price of foreign currency, and a fall in the exchange rate indicates a US
dollar appreciation against other currencies. Both series are normalized to zero in
2007Q4. The US NFA is scaled by the US nominal GDP. In the left column, the
real consumption growth in the RoW plunged deeper than in the US, both reaching
the lowest point in 2009Q1. The RoW real consumption growth dropped over 3%
more than the US. The middle column shows a sharp real exchange rate decline
around the same time. The weighted real exchange rate appreciation of the US
2The RoW in the data sample accounts for around 65% of the world output excluding the US
and is a fairly reasonable representation of the world economy.
3Using the trade-volume-weighted exchange rate is a common method to aggregate bilateral
exchange rates, such as BIS effective exchange rates. Using alternative weights would not change
the main results.
2
dollar was substantial, around 22.5% in 2009Q1 since 2007Q4.4 The sharp US dollar
appreciation was unexpected considering the large US NFA deterioration during the
GFC as shown in the right column. The US NFA, scaled by GDP, declined around
19% in 2009Q1 since 2007Q4.
The two observations are puzzling since the financial turmoil originated in the
US financial sector and then spread to other countries. Why would the peripheral
countries suffer more consumption growth drop than the epicenter country during a
global financial earthquake? How should we relate the external account adjustments
to the consumption and exchange rate dynamics during the GFC?
These questions are challenging to answer in existing macro models. First,
Gourinchas et al. (2010) and Maggiori (2017) argue that there is a large wealth
transfer from the US to the RoW during the GFC, and thus there should be a relative
increase in the RoW consumption, the opposite of what we see in the data. Their
models could generate consistent predictions on the US external account dynamics
during a crisis yet fail to match the consumption and exchange rate dynamics.
Second, conventional macro models predict that a country with a deteriorated
external balance sheet tends to have a depreciated currency value. Maggiori (2017)
characterizes the tension between the US dollar appreciation and the US NFA de-
terioration during the GFC as “the reserve currency paradox.” A related strand of
literature connects the dollar appreciation and the role of the US dollar as a reserve
currency (Farhi and Gabaix (2015); Jiang et al. (2018)) and argues that the US dol-
4Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2 presents the country-level evidence of global consumption and
exchange rate dynamics during the GFC. 12 out of 15 countries suffer a deeper consumption
growth drop and currency depreciation against the US dollar during the GFC.
3
lar appreciation during the GFC resulted from a demand for safe assets. However,
the consumption and external account dynamics are absent in their theory.
The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that could rational-
ize the two puzzling observations during the GFC and verify the model predictions
in the data. Despite extensive debates on the factors behind the global impacts of
the GFC, there are very few formal structures to analyze these phenomena jointly.
This paper fills this gap in the literature. The key assumption is that both the US
and foreign countries are financially constrained, though the constraint is milder
in the US. The mechanism is intuitive. The US financial intermediaries hold more
risky assets in tranquil times, both domestically and internationally, due to their
higher financial development level. Therefore, they are more exposed to financial
risks and suffer heavier capital losses when a crisis unfolds. In turn, they have a
stronger incentive to liquidate their risky asset holdings to deleverage and meet the
financial constraint, compared to their foreign counterparts. The US fire sales will
bring capital flows back to the US and smooth the domestic consumption during the
crisis. The relative increase in the US consumption will raise the relative demand for
domestic goods due to the domestic consumption bias, push up the domestic price
index, improve the terms of trade, and in the end, lead to a US dollar appreciation.
The NFA deterioration in the US is dominated by asset price fluctuations – the
valuation effect. However, I will show that the valuation effect does not play a role
in the contemporaneous relative consumption and exchange rate dynamics during
the crisis, a fact that has been overlooked in the literature.
Introducing asymmetric financial frictions in both countries generates inter-
4
esting interactions between financial sectors. The conventional wisdom considers
the US more financially developed and it has a better financial risk capacity than
other countries. Though economists realize the financial frictions in the US in a
closed economy such as Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), in
an international context, the US often serves as a frictionless benchmark country
and the deleveraging process is usually considered more urgent in foreign countries.
However, a higher financial development level is not equivalent to no financial fric-
tions in an open economy. In the presence of financial frictions, the US financial
intermediaries would face a tighter binding constraint and a stronger incentive to
deleverage during a crisis, since they bear more losses and higher financial risks
thanks to their aggressive risky asset holdings in normal times. This paper studies
the fire sales of the US financial intermediaries during a crisis in an open economy
and highlights its nontrivial global impacts.
The model predicts that the US financial sector will bear more capital losses
and thus fire sell during a financial crisis since they hold more risky assets in normal
times. The model predictions are consistent with the data. Figure 1.2 shows the
risky asset share on the external balance sheet, the financial sector net worth in
the US and RoW, and the US balance of payments during the GFC. The risky
asset share is defined as the annual equity asset holdings over the total asset net of
derivatives. The financial sector net worth is the monthly market value of financial
firms, normalized by output, and averaged for the RoW. The financial sector market
value is normalized to zero in 2007M10. The quarterly gross and net US capital
outflows are scaled by the US GDP. In the left column, over 55% of the US external
5
Note: This figure displays the external portfolio and financial sector market value in the US and
RoW, and the US balance of payment. The risky asset share is calculated as the equity asset
holdings (FDI, portfolio, and other equity investments) over the total asset net of derivatives.
The derivatives are excluded to avoid possible issues associated with the netting of contracts.
The financial sector market value is normalized by output and averaged for the RoW, normalized
to zero in 2007M10. The financial sector includes banks, life and non-life insurance, real estate
investment & services, real estate investment trusts, financial services, and equity investment
instruments following Industry Classification Benchmark jointly created by FTSE and Dow Jones.
I only include the financial firms that already exist before 2007 to exclude the extensive margin
of the market value changes. The gross and net outflows in the US are scaled by the US GDP.
This figure shows the US financial sector bore more capital losses and liquidated their risky asset
holdings during the GFC.
Figure 1.2: External Account and Financial Sector Net Worth
portfolio is composed of risky assets while the ratio in the RoW is around 30% since
2004. The US is more exposed to risky asset price fluctuations than the RoW, and
there is a sharp 14% decline in risky asset holdings in the US during the GFC. The
decline is less obvious in the RoW. Financial sectors suffered substantial capital
losses during the GFC as shown in the middle column, reaching the lowest point in
both the US and RoW in February 2009. The RoW financial sector market value,
scaled by output, recorded a 58.4% plunge while the US financial sector suffered a
61.8% dive since October 2007, around 3.4% more than their RoW counterparts.5
The right column shows a sharp gross outflow decline and negative net outflows in
the US, indicating a large capital retrenchment during the GFC.
5Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2 presents the country-level evidence of risky asset share and the
financial sector net worth during the GFC. The US suffered the largest risky asset share drop,
and bore more capital losses in the financial sector than two-thirds of the countries in the sample
during the GFC.
6
I then verify the model predictions in the data. Based on a data sample
covering major economies from 2003 to 2018, I run a panel regression and a recur-
sive VAR estimation to study how the gross capital inflows from the US in foreign
countries would respond when the global economic uncertainty rises, and how the
US investors’ decision on their overseas investment would impact foreign countries’
consumption and currency value. The panel regression finds that foreign countries’
gross capital inflows from the US will decline during a crisis. The capital stop in
foreign countries has significant negative effects on their real consumption growth
and currency value. The recursive VAR estimation finds similar results. To a one
standard deviation increase of VIX, the capital inflows from the US in foreign coun-
tries would incur a sharp decline; consumption declines more in foreign countries
than in the US; and the US dollar appreciates against foreign currencies.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I find that the recession
severity variation across countries, measured by real consumption growth, can be
explained by a dominant overseas factor – the US capital retrenchment. There
is a long literature studying the cross-country variations on the macroeconomic
impacts of the GFC. They attribute the recession severity in foreign countries to
their own domestic factors such as household leverage increase, credit growth, asset
price appreciation, and so on.6 In contrast, I find that the deeper consumption
decline in foreign countries is associated with the US capital retrenchment, a channel
less studied in the literature.
6See Berkmen et al. (2012); Claessens et al. (2010); Glick and Lansing (2010); Kamin and
DeMarco (2012); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011); Musso et al. (2011); Rose and Spiegel (2010,
2011, 2012).
7
The GFC also inspires a discussion of the role of the US in the international
financial system. Gourinchas et al. (2010) and Maggiori (2017) argue that the
US took on an exorbitant duty as a global insurance provider during the GFC.
They document the US NFA deterioration during the GFC and argue that the NFA
deterioration implies a wealth transfer from the US to the RoW, which would smooth
the RoW consumption. Assuming the US is either less risk-averse or financially
frictionless, their models are successful in matching the NFA dynamics but fail to
explain the risk-sharing patterns in the data. Following the NFA decomposition
in Gourinchas et al. (2012), I will show that the valuation effect does not play a
role in the contemporaneous relative consumption dynamics, even though it is the
dominant force in driving the NFA dynamics.
Second, I propose a new channel of the US dollar appreciation during the GFC
that could potentially solve the reserve currency paradox and the consumption–
real exchange rate anomaly. Several recent works provide theories to explain this
puzzling fact.7 They typically take the stand that the US assets are safe, and the
US dollar appreciation is a safety compensation. This paper proposes an alternative
channel: the US real exchange rate appreciates because the US capital retrenchment
from overseas increases the US consumption relative to foreign countries, which
raises the relative demand of domestic goods and pushes up the domestic price index.
The capital retrenchment stems from the US financial intermediaries’ deleveraging
process, not the flight-to-safety behavior by foreign agents. My model prediction is
consistent with the empirical findings in Fratzscher (2009). He documents that the
7See Colacito et al. (2018); Farhi and Gabaix (2015); Jiang et al. (2018).
8
currencies in countries with larger than average financial liabilities vis-à-vis the US
depreciated by 25% in the period July 2008 – February 2009, whereas those with a
lower-than-average financial exposure fell only by 14%.
The new channel also speaks to the consumption–real exchange rate anomaly.
Backus and Smith (1993) and Chari et al. (2002) discovered that the correlation
between relative consumption and real exchange rate is unity in the model while it is
negative in the data. The traditional international business cycle model predicts that
a country with a higher relative consumption will have a currency depreciation, at
odds with the US dollar appreciation during the GFC. The existing literature could
reconcile this discrepancy by introducing incompleteness in the financial market and
non-tradable goods, or low trade elasticity.8 I find that the introduction of financial
frictions in an open economy model could also account for this anomaly by breaking
the tight link between relative consumption and real exchange rate.
Relation to the literature. This paper is related to several strands of
literature. First, this paper is an open economy model with financial frictions in
the spirit of Dedola and Lombardo (2012); Dedola et al. (2013); Devereux and
Yetman (2010). These papers investigate the international transmission of shocks via
financial markets, extending the seminal work of Bernanke et al. (1999); Gertler and
Karadi (2011); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) into open
economies.9 Unlike their focus on international financial contagion, I investigate the
consumption and exchange rate dynamics during a global crisis. The international
8See Benigno and Thoenissen (2008); Corsetti et al. (2008).
9Other related papers include Bai and Zhang (2012); Bruno and Shin (2015); Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2013); Kollmann et al. (2011); Mendoza and Quadrini (2010); Perri and Quadrini (2018).
9
transmission mechanism in this paper is in line with Devereux and Yetman (2010).
The model in this paper is similar to Dedola et al. (2013) who also develop a two-
country open economy model based on Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010). There are two key differences from their work: first, financial
frictions in this paper are asymmetric between two countries; second, I introduce
exchange rate dynamics. The asymmetric financial frictions across countries are in
line with Caballero et al. (2008); Maggiori (2017); Mendoza et al. (2009). The most
relevant work is Maggiori (2017). The key novelty in this paper is to introduce
a milder financial constraint in the US. This assumption reverses the risk-sharing
pattern and exchange rate dynamics predicted in Maggiori (2017) and generates
predictions that are consistent with the data.
Second, this paper relates to the conventional international risk-sharing liter-
ature.10 Backus et al. (1992) is the first work documenting the puzzling fact that
the cross-country correlation of consumption is higher than the output in the theory
while the data reveals the opposite. Taking one step further, Gourinchas et al. (2010,
2012); Maggiori (2017) argue that international risk-sharing is not only insufficient
in the data but also works in one direction, the US insuring other countries during
a crisis due to its higher financial development level. Their risk-sharing conclusion
comes from model predictions while their models are built to match the NFA dy-
namics. However, their model predictions on global risk-sharing are at odds with
empirical evidence. The data reveals that foreign countries are providing insurance
to the US during a crisis. This paper provides a theory that could match both the
10See Cole and Obstfeld (1991); Kehoe and Perri (2002); Lewis (1996).
10
consumption and NFA dynamics observed during the GFC.
Third, this paper also speaks to the transfer problem. The transfer problem
about the relationship between international payments and exchange rate dynamics
dates back to 1920s between Ohlin (1929a,b) and Keynes (1929a,b,c). Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2004) find that on average a country with net liabilities tends to
have a depreciated currency. The conventional macro model fails to predict the US
dollar appreciation during the GFC. Maggiori (2017) proposes that the asymmetric
international trade cost could be the potential solution. Farhi and Gabaix (2015)
argue that safe countries will have a currency appreciation during a disaster since
they can recover faster, which replicates the US dollar appreciation during the GFC.
The underlying assumption in both Farhi and Gabaix (2015); Maggiori (2017) is that
capital flows into the US since the US is safe heaven during the GFC. I propose an
alternative channel: capital flows into the US due to the US financial intermediaries’
fire sales of international assets during their deleveraging process, which leads to a
US dollar appreciation. The model predictions are consistent with the empirical
evidence documented in Broner et al. (2013); Fratzscher (2009); Milesi-Ferretti and
Tille (2011); Tressel (2010).
Fourth, this paper is related to the strand of literature investigating the
consumption–real exchange rate anomaly. Backus and Smith (1993); Chari et al.
(2002) are among the first that find the discrepancy between the model and the data
on the correlations between relative consumption and real exchange rate. Benigno
and Thoenissen (2008); Corsetti et al. (2008) find that introducing incompleteness
in the financial market and nontradable goods, or low trade elasticity could miti-
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gate this discrepancy. This paper is complementary to their work and shows that
introducing financial frictions could also break the tight link between relative con-
sumption and real exchange rate in the model. Moreover, the relative rise in home
country consumption and home currency value is caused by a positive shock in their
work. Yet the similar consumption and exchange rate dynamics in this paper are
generated by a negative shock.
Structure of the paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the
second section, I describe the model setup and provide an analysis of relative con-
sumption and exchange rate dynamics in the presence of asymmetric financial fric-
tions. In the third section, I report and discuss the quantitative results. The fourth
section provides empirical evidence in support of the model predictions. And the
last section concludes.
1.2 Open Economy with Asymmetric Financial Frictions
This section presents a two-country two-goods open economy model with
asymmetric financial frictions. Each country is endowed with a differentiated good
and goods can flow freely between countries without a trading cost. In each country,
savers make deposits in their domestic financial intermediaries (banks), who will in-
vest in the claims against Home and Foreign endowments. Since the endowments
fluctuate over time, I refer to the claims against them as risky assets. Financial
frictions in this model arise in an agency problem that constrains the banks’ ability
to obtain funds from domestic savers. Other than that, there are no frictions in
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enforcing the financial contracts while banks claim their shares of the endowments.
The key assumption in this paper is to introduce asymmetric financial devel-
opment levels in the two countries. Home banks are assumed to be more financially
developed such that they are larger and run at a higher leverage ratio. We can
think of the Home country as the US, and the Foreign country as the RoW. I will
mainly describe the settings for the Home country and specify Foreign country equa-
tions when necessary. Consistent with the convention in the international finance
literature, the Foreign variables are denoted by the superscript *. Throughout the




Each country is populated by a continuum of measure one of households.
Within each household, there are 1− f fraction of the households that are “savers”
and the remaining fraction f “bankers”. Savers make decisions on consumption
and savings. Each banker manages a financial intermediary which raises funds from
domestic savers and invests in both domestic and foreign risky assets. The deposits
in banks are riskless one-period securities. To make the existence of financial in-
termediaries valid, I assume that only bankers have the technology to hold risky
assets. The financial intermediary can be best thought of as a bank. Both savers
and bankers transfer their earnings back to their households and hence there is per-
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fect risk-sharing within each household. Households are homogeneous and I can
describe the behavior of the representative household for simplicity.
Consumption Maximization. Each household in the Home country has a






where CHt and C
F
t are the consumption of Home and Foreign goods. I further assume
α ∈ (0.5, 1) to reflect the consumption bias towards domestic goods.
Solving the static consumption maximization problem yields Home households’












where pt and p
∗
t are the prices of Home and Foreign goods and Pt the price index of
the Home consumption basket.













where an increase in ToT represents a deterioration of the Home ToT.




where a fall in E is a Home currency appreciation.
Utility Maximization. The representative household in the Home country








Θt = βt−1(C̄t−1)Θt−1 = ζ(1 + C̄t−1)
−κΘt−1, Θ0 = 1
is the external endogenous discount factor borrowing from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003) to induce stationarity. This assumption pins down the steady state without
changing the dynamic results of the model.
The budget constraint for the representative household is
Ct +Dt = Πt +Rt−1Dt−1
where Ct is the consumption at time t, Dt the quantity of the one-period deposits
from t to t + 1, and Rt−1 the real interest rate from t − 1 to t. The profit Πt is
generated from domestic banks.
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The Euler equation is:
EtβtΛt,t+1Rt = 1
where βtΛt,t+1 = βt
uc(t+1)
uc(t)
is the stochastic discount factor and uc(t) the marginal
utility with respect to consumption at time t.
1.2.1.2 Banks
Banks operate in two markets: the domestic retail market, where they obtain
deposits from savers, and the global asset markets, where they can invest in risky
assets issued by either the Home or Foreign country. In addition to obtaining funds
from domestic savers, banks can also raise funds internally by their own net worth.
For an individual Home bank, the balance sheet constraint implies:
Qts
H
t + EtQ∗t sFt = nt + dt
where sHt is the holdings of risky assets issued by the Home country and s
F
t the
holdings of risky assets issued by the Foreign country. Qt is the price of Home risky
assets and Q∗t the price of Foreign risky assets. Overall, the value of risky assets
must equal the sum of its net worth nt and the domestic deposits dt.
For convenience, I denote the value of total assets held by a Home bank ut as
ut = Qts
H
t + EtQ∗t sFt
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and define the portfolio share of Foreign risky assets χt as
EtQ∗t sFt = χtut
Bankers have an incentive to over-accumulate capitals instead of paying div-
idends to their households and fund the investments internally if they would stay
in business forever. To avoid potential capital over-accumulation, I assume an ex-
ogenous role switch rate between savers and bankers so that each banker can stay
as a banker only for a finite horizon. Each period, with an i.i.d probability 1− σ, a
banker exits in the next period and becomes a saver. Upon exit, a banker transfers
retained earnings to its household. Meanwhile, (1−σ)f savers will randomly become
bankers, keeping the overall population of savers and bankers constant over time.
Since new bankers need start-up funds to operate, I assume that the households
transfer the fraction ξ
1−σ of the total assets of exiting bankers to new bankers.
An individual Home bank’s net worth from time t− 1 to time t evolves as



















where Rkt and R
∗
kt are the gross rate of return on Home and Foreign risky assets
respectively, and Yt and Y
∗
t are Home and Foreign endowments.
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Given that bankers pay dividends to their households only when they exit,








To motivate an endogenous constraint on banks’ ability to raise external funds,
I introduce the following agency problem. Suppose after obtaining funds and mak-
ing investment decisions, bankers may divert a fraction θ of their total assets for
individual purposes. If a banker diverts the assets, the bank will be forced into
bankruptcy and shut down. Depositors will only be able to reclaim the remaining
fraction (1−θ) of the assets but would not be able to recover the diverted part. With
the recognition of the bankers’ incentive to divert the funds, depositors will restrict
the amount they lend. In this way, an endogenous credit constraint on banks arises.
To validate the bankers’ incentive of diverting funds to their own households and
still keep the model tractable, it is better to think that savers save their deposits in
banks that are managed by bankers belonging to other households.
The incentive compatibility constraint for depositors to be willing to deposit
in banks must be satisfied by each Home bank:
Vt(ut, χt, dt) ≥ θut
In general, the Home banks’ problem satisfies the Bellman equation, subject
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to the endogenous credit constraint:




(1− σ)nt + σVt(ut, χt, dt)
]
Vt(ut, χt, dt) ≥ θut
I conjecture that the value function of the Home banks is linear in {Ut, dt}:
Vt = η
H
st (1− χt)Ut + ηFstχtUt − ηdtdt
where ηHst is the marginal value of investing in Home risky assets, η
F
st the marginal
value of Foreign risky asset investment, and ηdt the marginal cost of domestic de-
posits. These are time-varying parameters that will be determined endogenously.
The first order conditions are:














where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier for the credit constraint, and φt is defined as
Home banks’ leverage ratio. Combining the first order conditions and the conjec-
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tured value function, the value function is linear if {ηHst , ηFst, ηdt} satisfy:





ηdt = EtβtΛt,t+1Ωt+1Rt (1.6)
where
Ωt = 1− σ + σ(1 + λt)ηdt
is defined as the marginal value of banks’ net worth at time t, which is a weighted
average of marginal values of exiting and continuing banks.
The key assumption in this paper is that both the Home and Foreign countries
are financially constrained, while the constraint is milder in the Home country. The
financial development level in each country is measured by θ. A smaller value of θ
indicates a higher financial development level. Intuitively, if banks in one country
could divert a smaller fraction of the total assets they are managing, depositors in
that country will be more willing to save in their financial intermediaries. In the
end, banks can run at a higher leverage ratio, hold more risky assets, and earn more
profits. When θ = 0, banks can raise an arbitrary amount of funds from domestic
savers and invest in risky assets, driving the risk premium between the asset return
and borrowing cost to zero, as shown in Equation (1.1). As a result, the leverage
ratio constraint imposed by Equation (1.3) will not be binding.
The financial development level in one country can be measured in multiple
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dimensions as documented in the influential work Beck et al. (1999, 2010), presum-
ably the size and efficiency of the financial system. In the highly-stylized model
in this paper, the financial development level in each country is simplified into the
value of θ. In the steady state, a smaller θ indicates a higher bank leverage ratio
and larger risky asset holdings at the same time, where the former captures the
efficiency and the latter the size of the financial sector in the model. This alleviates
the concern that some European countries were as highly levered as the US in their
financial sectors before the GFC, yet we still count them as the RoW in this paper.
Considering the size of these European countries’ financial sectors, none of them is
larger than 30% of the financial sector market value in the US or 40% of the overall
external equity asset holdings. The US is the more financially developed country
measured in almost every dimension, even though some other countries might be
comparable in some categories. Without any doubt, measuring a country’s finan-
cial development level by a single parameter is an over-simplification, but it is a
reasonable assumption to serve the main purpose of this paper.
The term βtΛt,t+1Ωt+1 in Equation (1.4) to (1.6) is the “augmented stochas-
tic discount factor”, which differs from the representative households’ stochastic
discount factor βtΛt,t+1. From a perspective of asset pricing, banks are concerned
about two risks: consumption risk and financial risk. Banks dislike the assets with
low returns when the aggregate consumption or their net worth is low. The former
is captured by the term Λt,t+1. The latter, due to the credit constraint, is captured
by Ωt+1. If banks face no credit constraints, the Lagrangian multiplier λt = 0 and
the marginal value of banks’ net worth Ωt+1 = 1. The individual bank’s value will
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be determined only by its net worth Vt = nt, and it will price the assets as the
representative household. However, if banks are binding by the credit constraint,
the consumption risk and the financial risk will be positively correlated in equilib-
rium, and banks will discount assets more than the representative households. In
the steady state, a smaller θ indicates a smaller financial risk Ωt+1.
Therefore, I assume that
0 < θ < θ∗ < 1
to reflect the higher financial development level in the Home country. This is the key
assumption in this model to generate the consumption and exchange rate dynamics
that match the empirical observations. Other than that, the two countries are
symmetric. In equilibrium, I assume the credit constraint always binds within a
local region of the steady state.
The aggregate evolution of the net wealth of Home banks includes two parts:





t−1 + EtR∗ktQ∗t−1SFt−1 −Rt−1Dt−1
]
+ ξUt−1
Portfolio Choice. Besides the no-arbitrage condition between the retail mar-
ket and the global asset market as in a closed economy, there is an additional no-
arbitrage condition between Home and Foreign risky assets from Equation (1.2).
Otherwise, banks will invest more in the asset with a higher return, push the asset
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price up, and eventually drive the return discrepancy between the two assets to zero.
In equilibrium, one of the two no-arbitrage conditions from the Home and
Foreign banks’ problem is redundant up to the first order approximation. Here I
make a further assumption: χt = χ
∗
t = χ, i.e., portfolio choice is symmetric between
countries and constant over time following Dedola et al. (2013). The portfolio choice
is determined by the domestic consumption bias in the steady state χ = 1−α, that
is, the bias towards domestic assets equals the consumption bias towards domestic
goods.11 Households will hold the share of claims that is consistent with their
preference towards that good.
1.2.1.3 Equilibrium
To close the model, I will specify the remaining variables and the aggregate
market clearing conditions.
The Home and Foreign endowments Yt and Y
∗
t are exogenously given as






where Y and Y ∗ are normalized to one. At and A
∗
t are the endowment shocks
following AR(1) processes






t−1 + εA∗t + εt
11The proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
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where εAt and εA∗t are country-specific endowment innovations and εt is a global
common innovation. The endowment shocks are the only sources of exogenous
disturbances in the model.
Without loss of generality, the total supply of each risky asset is also normal-
ized to one
SF + S∗F = 1, SH + S∗H = 1
The capital clearing market conditions are
Qt = (1− χt)Ut + Etχ∗tU∗t , Q∗t = (1− χ∗t )U∗t +
χtUt
Et












The trade balance (NX) is defined as the difference between the endowment




Yt − Ct, NX∗t =
p∗t
P ∗t
Y ∗t − C∗t
The net foreign asset (NFA) is the difference between foreign assets owned
by domestic banks and domestic assets owned by foreign banks denominated in
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domestic price





In this section, I will report some analytical analysis of the model and highlight
the key mechanisms in consumption and exchange rate dynamics.
1.2.2.1 Global Consumption Dynamics
Home risky asset pricing equations in the Home and Foreign country are












The two equations imply that Home and Foreign banks are pricing the same
risky asset with different stochastic discount factors due to asymmetric financial de-
velopment levels. The terms Ωt+1 and Ω
∗
t+1 measure their financial risks, receptively.
























is a pre-determined condition.12
The dynamics of relative consumption, measured in Home currency, between
the Home and Foreign countries are determined by two components: the relative
financial risk and the initial condition. The initial condition is pinned down by
the calibration. For a large range of reasonable parameter values, the main results
do not change. For the rest of the analysis, I will focus on the relative financial
risk term. The Home country is less financially constrained and its financial risk is
lower in tranquil times. Thus, Home banks run at a higher leverage ratio and hold
more risky assets. When a crisis unfolds, Home banks suffer heavier capital losses,
deviate more from their credit constraints, and their financial risk surge higher




hand side (RHS) of Equation (1.7) will decline. So does the relative consumption
in the Foreign country. This is the key consumption dynamics condition in the
model. Home banks have a stronger incentive to fire sell their risky assets holdings
to deleverage, which will smooth the consumption in the Home country.
My model prediction is contrary to Maggiori (2017) where the term Ωt+1 is
missing in his risk-sharing equation when the US financial sector is assumed to be
financially frictionless. In this case, the consumption dynamics condition is only
determined by the foreign country’s financial risk. During a downturn, the US
financial intermediaries can run at an arbitrary high leverage ratio and have no
12I report the consumption share dynamics instead of the consumption growth for the rest of
the analysis following Maggiori (2017). The consumption quantity dynamics and the exchange
rate dynamics move in the same direction to a Home and Global endowment shock, and opposite
directions to a Foreign endowment shock. Since the first two scenarios are of particular interest,
the main results are invariant to this change.
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incentives to deleverage. Rising financial risks in foreign countries will improve
their relative consumption. Introducing financial frictions in both countries yields
interesting interactions between financial sectors across countries. In the steady
state, a higher financial development level means a higher leverage ratio and a lower
financial risk in the Home country. However, when a crisis breaks out, Home banks
are hit harder and their financial risks increase more than Foreign banks.
Consumption–real exchange rate anomaly. The consumption dynamics
condition also provides a new approach to address the consumption–real exchange
rate anomaly. Suppose there are no credit constraints in both countries, i.e., Ωt =




which is the exchange rate determination equation in a standard international busi-
ness cycle model. In equilibrium, when relative consumption rises in the Home
country, the Home exchange rate will depreciate. The correlation between relative
consumption and real exchange rate will be unity according to the model, yet we find
no supporting evidence in the data. Introducing financial frictions in both countries
could break the tight link between relative consumption and exchange rate. When
the relative financial risk increases in the Home country during a crisis, so is the
relative consumption. As will be shown next, the relative demand for Home goods
will rise due to the domestic consumption bias, push up the domestic price index,
and result in a Home currency appreciation. The relative consumption and real
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exchange rate move in the opposite directions as documented in the data.
1.2.2.2 Exchange Rate Dynamics
From the consumption dynamics condition and the goods markets clearing

































Plug these demand functions back to the consumption dynamics condition, I get
the ToT and real exchange rate as functions of the relative financial risk
ToTt+1 =
(1− α)Γt + α
Ω∗t+1
Ωt+1






Et+1 = ToT 2α−1t+1 (1.9)
The ToT is determined by two components: the endowment ratio and the
relative financial risk. First, the endowment fluctuations will alter the relative supply
of the two goods. If the Home good becomes relatively more scarce, the relative
price of the Home good will rise and improve the Home ToT. This effect is present
irrespective of domestic consumption bias. Second, if there is domestic consumption
bias (α > 0.5), the ToT will comove positively with the relative financial risk term.
As discussed in the previous part, the relative consumption will increase along with
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the relative financial risk in the Home country during a crisis. It will raise the relative
demand for the Home good, push up the Home good price index, and improve the
Home ToT. Overall, the endowment ratio effect turns out to be the dominant force.
Besides the endowment ratio effect and the relative financial risk effect, the exchange
rate is also determined by the domestic consumption bias. If α > 0.5, the ToT and
the exchange rate will be positively related. A Home crisis will lead to a Home ToT
improvement and a Home currency appreciation. And a Foreign crisis will lead to
a Home ToT deterioration and a Foreign currency appreciation. Suppose there is
a global innovation that will affect the Home and Foreign endowment equally, the
endowment ratio will remain constant during a crisis. In this case, the financial risk
term will lead to a Home currency appreciation.
Reserve currency paradox. In the absence of financial frictions in the
US, Maggiori (2017) predicts that the US dollar will depreciate during a global
crisis, which makes US dollar-denominated assets riskier ex-ante. This prediction
contradicts the US dollar appreciation during the GFC, and Maggiori (2017) refers
to this contradiction as “the reserve currency paradox”. Complementary to the
strand of literature arguing that the US dollar appreciation during GFC comes
from its safety compensation as a global reserve currency, I propose an alternative
channel: the fire sales by US financial sector due to its surging financial risk. During
a crisis, the deleveraging process by the US financial intermediaries will lead to a
capital inflow into the US and thus a US dollar appreciation. The two views are
not necessarily in contradiction but rather complementary to each other. First, the
flight-to-safety argument typically focuses on the US safe assets such as the US
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treasuries, which are absent in this model, since this model only has risky assets.
Second, the former captures the capital inflows into the US due to the demand of
the US safe assets from foreign agents, while the latter captures those from the fire
sales by the US agents.
1.3 Quantitative Results
In this section, I will report the quantitative results of the model and verify
the conjecture in the analysis.
First, I report the steady state under the benchmark calibration. In the steady
state, the Home country will hold more risky assets, enjoy more consumption, and
run a current account deficit, as long as it has a higher financial development level.
Also, I conduct steady state comparative statics by varying Home and Foreign coun-
tries’ financial development level parameters θ and θ∗. As predicted in the previous
section, in the steady state, the more financially developed the Home country is, the
lower the financial risk it will bear, the higher leverage ratio it could run at, and
the more risky assets it will hold.
Second, I report the impulse responses of the key variables. During a global
financial crisis, the Home country consumption will increase relative to the Foreign
country and the Home currency will appreciate, along with a NFA deterioration
and a capital retrenchment, consistent with the empirical observations during the
GFC. I will focus on the impacts of a global shock in the analysis so that I can
isolate the effects of the relative financial risk on the exchange rate from that of
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the endowment supply ratio. The impulse responses to country-specific shocks are
reported in Appendix A.2.
Third, I decompose the NFA dynamics into the valuation effect and trans-
action effect following Gourinchas and Rey (2007a,b). I will show that the NFA
deterioration in the Home country is mainly due to the valuation effect. However, a
country-level balance sheet transformation will show that the valuation effect does
not play a role in the contemporaneous relative consumption. Instead, the transac-
tion effect has an active but minor role in affecting the consumption and exchange
rate dynamics.
1.3.1 Calibration
There are 12 parameters in the model and Table 1.1 presents their values in
the benchmark calibration. I set α = 0.75 to reflect the domestic consumption
bias following Engel (2011). The endogenous discount factor parameters are set as
ζ = 0.995 and κ = 0.009 to target the Home Discount Factor at 0.99 and the Home
to Foreign consumption ratio at 2 in the steady state.13
I follow the calibration in the banks’ problem closely with Gertler and Karadi
(2011) considering my model is an open economy extension based on their work. I
first set σ = 0.972 to match an average horizon of banks of a decade. The start-up
funds transfer parameter is calibrated ξ = 0.001 to target Home banks’ annualized
risk premium at 100bp. The Home and Foreign financial development levels are
θ = 0.349 and θ∗ = 0.692. The corresponding Home and Foreign banks’ leverage
13I follow Choi et al. (2008) to calibrate κ targeting relative consumption in a two-country model.
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Description Parameter Value Note
Domestic consumption bias α 0.75 Engel (2011)
Endogenous discount factor ζ 0.995 Home Discount Factor: 0.99
Endogenous discount factor κ 0.009 Consumption Ratio: 2
Start-up funds transfer ξ 0.001 Home Risk Premium: 100bp
Bank survival rate σ 0.972 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Home financial development level θ 0.349 Home Leverage Ratio: 6





Note: This table reports the parameter values in the benchmark calibration. The parameters in
the bank problem are calibrated at the same targets with Gertler and Karadi (2011) except for
the bank leverage ratio. The Home country is calibrated to be more financially developed with a
bank leverage ratio at 6 in the steady state, while the Foreign bank leverage ratio at 4. The two
countries are symmetric except for the θs.
Table 1.1: Parameters
ratios in the steady state are 6 and 4, respectively, which are close to the calibration
targets in Gertler and Karadi (2011). They calibrate the US financial intermediaries’
leverage ratio at 4. It is a tricky task to calibrate the banks’ leverage ratio given
its wide range among various sectors and different types of banks. The goal is to
reflect the asymmetric financial development levels in the two countries and keep
the parameters away from the boundaries. I assume the endowment shocks follow
AR(1) processes. The variance of all innovations is set to be a 10% deviation, and
the autocorrelations of endowment shocks are 0.95. The global shock will hit both
Home and Foreign endowments at the same time.
1.3.2 Steady States
The benchmark steady state results are reported in Table 1.2. In the steady
state, Home banks run at a higher leverage ratio and hold more risky assets due to
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their more advanced development level. As a result, the Home country earns more
profits, enjoys more consumption, and runs current account deficits. This is in line
with the global imbalance literature (Caballero et al. (2008); Mendoza et al. (2009))
and the exorbitant privilege hypothesis (Gourinchas et al. (2010)), which argue that
the US holds more risky assets and earns excess returns of external assets. The
higher aggregate consumption in the Home country implies a higher demand for
Home goods due to the domestic consumption bias. As a result, it leads to a higher
Home good price relative to the Foreign good, and both the ToT and exchange
rate are smaller than one in the steady state. Since the two goods are not perfect
substitutes, domestic consumption bias will also generate a domestic asset portfolio
bias. Banks will hold a larger share of the claims against the good their domestic
savers prefer.
Variables Home Country Foreign Country
Consumption 0.746 0.373
Profits 0.249 0.196
Bank Total Asset 59.708 29.854
Bank Net Worth 9.951 7.463
Bank Leverage Ratio 6 4
Risk Premium 100bp 184bp
Net Export -0.111 0.138
NFA 8.914 -11.066
ToT 0.649
Real Exchange Rate 0.806
Overseas Asset Portfolio 0.25
Note: This table reports the value of key variables in the steady state in the benchmark calibration.
The Home and Foreign countries’ bank leverage ratio and the Home country’s risk premium are
calibration targets. The top panel displays the household’s variables, the middle panel for the
bank’s variables, and the bottom panel for the international account variables. Net export and
NFA are measured in domestic currency. In the steady state, the Home country holds more risky
assets, earns more revenues, and enjoys more consumption.
Table 1.2: Benchmark Steady State
33
The NFA in the Home country is positive while the US has a negative inter-
national investment position in reality. This is because I only model risky assets in
the international asset market. A potential solution to this issue is to introduce an
inter-bank market for safe assets. Foreign banks have a higher precautionary saving
incentive since they are more likely to hit the binding credit constraint relative to
Home banks. Therefore, they will borrow from Home banks in the inter-bank safe
asset market. Overall, Home banks could have a negative NFA position. However,
introducing an inter-bank market will not alter the main results of this paper. Recall
that the consumption and exchange rate dynamics are determined by the relative
financial risk as discussed in the previous part. As long as the Home country holds
more risky assets in the steady state, they will bear more capital losses in a crisis
and their financial risk will surge higher relative to Foreign banks.
To verify the analysis in the previous part, I conduct steady state comparative
statics and show that θ and θ∗ are good measures of the Home and Foreign countries’
financial development levels, shown in Figure 1.3. I fix Foreign banks’ leverage ratio
at 4 and search from the smallest valid θ (the steady state exists) to the upper limit
θ∗ (θ ≤ θ∗). I end up with a series of (θ, θ∗) pairs such that Foreign banks’ leverage
ratio is fixed at 4 and Home banks’ leverage ratio ranges from slightly above 4 to
around 25, as shown in the top-left panel. In the top-right panel, Home banks bear
lower financial risk in the steady state as they are more developed, and the Home
financial risk will be even lower if Home banks run at a higher leverage ratio. As
we can see, when Home banks’ leverage ratio approaches 25, their financial risk
almost degenerates to unity, which indicates Home banks are barely constrained by
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Note: This figure displays the corresponding bank leverage, financial risk, risky asset share, and
consumption share by varying financial development levels. Home banks’ leverage ratio varies with
the feasible (θ, θ∗) pairs, while Foreign banks’ leverage ratio is fixed at 4. This figure shows that
as the financial constraint in the Home country gets less binding, it will run at a higher leverage
ratio, hold more risky assets, and consume more.
Figure 1.3: Steady State Comparative Statics
the credit constraint. In the bottom row, the Home country holds a larger share
of risky assets, earns more profits and consumes more due to its higher financial
development level. As the financial constraint becomes less tightening in the Home
country, it could hold even more risky assets and be able to consume more.
1.3.3 Impulse Responses
There are three exogenous innovations in the model: two country-specific en-
dowment innovations and one global endowment innovation. I will only report the
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impulses responses to a global shock in the main text to highlight the role of the rel-
ative financial risk during a crisis. The impulse responses to country-specific shocks
are reported in Appendix A.2. The global innovation will affect both Home and For-
eign endowments equally at the same time. Figure 1.4 presents the key variables’
impulse responses in the model.
When a crisis unfolds, endowments and asset prices decline in both countries.
Since both Home and Foreign banks hold risky assets on their balance sheet, bank
net worth declines in both countries. However, Home banks bear heavier capital
losses during the crisis as they hold a larger share of risky assets in steady state.
They deviate more from the leverage ratio constraint and their financial risk rises
higher than foreign banks. Therefore, Home banks have a stronger incentive to liq-
uidate their risky assets holdings to deleverage and their risky asset share declines.
The fire sales will smooth the domestic consumption, leading to an increase in the
consumption share in the Home country.14 The increase in the relative consumption
in the Home country raises the relative demand of Home good due to the domestic
consumption bias, pushes up the relative price of the Home good, improves the Home
ToT, and lead to a Home currency appreciation. The Home NFA deterioration is
driven by multiple factors that will be discussed shortly. The main driving force is
the asset price plunges as Home banks hold a larger amount of risky assets. The
financial sector fire sales will lead to a capital retrenchment in the Home country,
and the gross outflows decline. The model generates consistent global consump-
14Figure A.5 in Appendix A.2 shows the impulse responses of real consumption growth to ex-
ogenous innovations. The real consumption growth in the Foreign country declines more than in
the Home country to each endowment shock.
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Note: This figure displays the key variables’ impulse responses to a 10% endowment decline glob-
ally. The figure highlights the heavier capital losses in the Home country during a global crisis and
its stronger incentive to fire sell and deleverage. The fire sales by the Home country will smooth
its domestic consumption, improve its currency value, and lead to a capital retrenchment despite
an NFA deterioration.
Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses to a Global Endowment Shock
tion, exchange rate, and external account dynamics with the empirical observations
during the GFC as shown in Figure 1.1 and 1.2.
This is the key risk-sharing mechanism in this model. As predicted by this
model, a higher financial development level is a double-edged sword. It enables the
US banks to run at a higher leverage ratio, bear lower risks, hold more risky assets,
and earn more profits in tranquil times. Meanwhile, the US is also more exposed
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to risks, and aggressive risky asset holdings will backfire when the crisis breaks out.
During a crisis, the US banks will bear heavier losses and witness rocketing financial
risks. In the end, the US banks will have to fire sell their risky assets holdings to
deleverage, which will smooth the Home country consumption and result in a Home
currency appreciation.
One last note is that the relative consumption in the Home country increases
in the first two years and then starts declining. This is because Foreign banks hold
more risky assets and earn more profits after they take over Home banks’ fire sales.
Therefore, the relative consumption in the Foreign country will gradually increase
over time.
1.3.4 The Role of Valuation Effect
The impulse responses in the model bring a puzzling phenomenon: on one
hand, the Home NFA deterioration implies a capital gain in the Foreign country’s
balance sheet and it predicts a relative increase in Foreign country’s consumption as
argued by Gourinchas et al. (2010) and Maggiori (2017); on the other hand, the fire
sales by Home banks will bring capital flows back to the Home country and smooth
the Home consumption as predicted in my model. In this part, I will decompose
the NFA into the valuation effect and the transaction effect to explain this seemly
puzzling phenomenon. The Home NFA deterioration during a crisis is mainly due to
the valuation effect yet it does not affect the contemporaneous global consumption
and exchange rate dynamics.
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Sum up the budget constraints of the Home households and banks, we get the
Home country budget constraint




where the RHS is the Home country’s income from returns of holding both Home and
Foreign risky assets, and the LHS is the Home country consumption Ct and wealth
Ut. The Home country’s income is either consumed or saved for the next period.
Analogously, the Foreign country budget constraint denoted in Home currency is
EtC∗t + EtU∗t = EtR∗kt(1− χ∗t−1)U∗t−1 +RktEt−1χ∗t−1U∗t−1
Subtract the two countries’ budget constraints, we get the relative consump-
tion equation between the two countries15










=− NXt + C̃t − EtC̃∗t (1.10)
where Wt = (1 − χt)Ut and W∗t = (1 − χ∗t )U∗t are the value of Home and Foreign
countries’ domestic asset holdings from t to t + 1, and C̃ and C̃∗t are consumption
that could be supported from domestic markets, which reflects each country’s sav-
ing decisions in their domestic asset market. The intuition of Equation (1.10) is
15The detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.4.
39
straightforward. To consume more than the Foreign country at period t, the Home
country can either save less for the next period in their domestic market or borrow
from the Foreign country, i.e., a negative net export or equivalently, a positive net
import. The last step comes from Gourinchas et al. (2012)
∆NFAt = NXt + VAt (1.11)
where ∆NFAt is the changes of NFA from t− 1 to t in the Home country, NXt the
net export, and VAt the valuation effect. A negative VAt implies a wealth transfer
from the Home country to Foreign country, as argued by Gourinchas et al. (2012)
and Maggiori (2017).
In an autarky economy where χt = χ
∗
t = 0,
Ct = C̃t = RktWt−1 −Wt, C∗t = C̃∗t = R∗ktW∗t−1 −W∗t
and
NXt = 0
There would be no risk-sharing between the two economies and thus no consumption
reallocation between the two countries through the international trade. The overall
consumption is only determined by the agents’ saving decisions in their domestic
asset markets.
From Equation (1.10), we can draw two important findings: 1, the valuation
effect does not affect the contemporaneous relative consumption dynamics, though
40
it is the dominant force of the NFA fluctuations as will be shown shortly; 2, the rela-
tive consumption dynamics is mainly determined by the countries’ saving decisions,
either domestic or international.
Firstly, Figure 1.5 shows the decomposition of the NFA dynamics into the
valuation effect and transaction effect, and demonstrates the dominant role of the
valuation effect. The valuation effect measures the fluctuations of NFA that can
be explained by asset price movements. During a global crisis, risky asset prices
are depressed and both the NFA and valuation effect will deteriorate in the Home
country, as shown in the left column. Most of the NFA deterioration is explained
by the valuation effect, and the transaction effect plays a minor role. The right
column verifies the model prediction using the US international investment position
data from the BEA. We can see a close tie between the NFA and valuation effect
fluctuations. The US NFA declined by around 40% in 2008Q3 since the breakout of
the crisis while the net export dropped by 1%.
Note: This figure displays the decomposition of the US NFA dynamics in the model and the data
following Equation (1.11). All variables are scaled by output in both the model and the data. The
right y-axis is for the transaction effect, i.e., the net exports. The data is from BEA International
Investment Position Tables. This figure highlights the dominant role of the valuation effect in the
US NFA dynamics.
Figure 1.5: US NFA Dynamics Decomposition
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Secondly, to show how the saving decisions and fire sales in the Home country
determine the relative consumption, Figure 1.6 presents the impulse responses of
key variables in two economies: one where both the Home and Foreign country are
financially constrained as in this paper (the top row), and the other one where the
Home country is financially frictionless as in Maggiori (2017) (the bottom row). The
two economies are calibrated to be comparable.16 At first glance, the two economies
predict contrary relative consumption and exchange rate in a crisis, though the NFA
in the Home country declines in both economies. The left column shows the relative
consumption decomposition as in Equation (1.10). When the global shock hits in
my model, Home banks will fire sell their asset holdings to deleverage, and their
savings for the next period decline. In addition, the Home country borrows from
the Foreign country and the net exports decline. Overall, the relative consumption
in the Home country increases during a global crisis, as shown in the top row. As
a result, the Home ToT improves and the Home currency appreciates. In contrast,
in an economy with a financially frictionless Home country, Home banks could keep
running at a high leverage ratio without any incentives to deleverage during a crisis.
Instead, Foreign banks will fire sell and deleverage. In this case, the Foreign coun-
try’s consumption increases relative to the Home country, and the Home currency
will depreciate, as shown in the bottom row. The Home NFA in both economies
will deteriorate due to the valuation effect. However, the transaction effect works in
opposite directions. In the frictional Home country economy, the fire sales by Home
16The two economies have the same Home country interest rate, Home and Foreign banks’
leverage ratio, and relative consumption ratio in the steady state as in the benchmark calibration.
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banks imply a capital retrenchment in the Home country. In contrast, there will be a
capital flight in the Home country during a crisis if it faces no credit constraint. The
fire sale behavior is the key factor that determines the global risk-sharing pattern
since it reflects the agents’ saving decisions for the next period, and in turn, affects
relative consumption and exchange rate dynamics.
Note: This figure displays the consumption, exchange rate, and external account dynamics to a
global shock in the Home country in the benchmark model and a model with a frictionless Home
country (Maggiori (2017)). The two models are calibrated to match the same targets in the steady
state. The first row displays the impulse responses of the benchmark model, and the second row
the frictionless Home country model. In the right column, the right y-axis is for the gross capital
outflow in the Home country. This figure shows that introducing financial frictions in the Home
country will reverse the risk-sharing pattern and the exchange rate dynamics, though both models
predict an NFA deterioration in the Home country.
Figure 1.6: Home Country Impulse Responses Comparison
1.4 Empirical Verification
This section empirically verifies the model predictions on global consumption
and exchange rate dynamics. I collect the data on consumption, exchange rate, and
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the bilateral balance of payment vis-à-vis the US for major countries. I will focus
on the gross US capital outflows to foreign countries, i.e., gross inflows from the US
in foreign countries, instead of the net outflows hereafter. The reason is that the
fluctuations of gross US outflows reflect the behavior of US investors while the net
outflow is a composite result of both US and foreign investors’ decisions. I study
the gross US capital outflows to investigate the impacts of US fire sales on the world
economy during the GFC. The recent literature starts emphasizing the role of gross
flows since the influential work by Forbes and Warnock (2012).
First, I run a panel regression to study how the gross capital inflows from the
US in foreign countries will respond during the GFC and how they will affect the
foreign countries’ consumption growth and exchange rate. The result shows that
a crisis is associated with a large capital retrenchment in the US, and the capital
stop in foreign countries has significant negative impacts on their consumption and
currency value.
Second, I study the dynamic responses of global consumption and exchange
rate by estimating a VAR model. In response to an increase in economic uncertainty,
the US will retrench its capital outflow from overseas, which leads to a deeper
consumption decline and currency depreciation in foreign countries. The empirical
results are consistent with the model predictions.
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1.4.1 Data
The data sample runs from 2003Q1 to 2018Q4 and includes 10 advanced
economies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, United Kingdom, United States) and 6 emerging economies (Argentina,
Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico). The sample span and size are mainly con-
strained by the data availability of the bilateral international transaction tables
vis-à-vis the US released by BEA. The quarterly nominal consumption, GDP, ex-
change rate, and CPI data are from the IMF IFS database. The consumption,
exchange rate, and GDP are converted into real terms using CPI. The global eco-
nomic uncertainty is measured by the VIX as standard in the literature. The details
of data construction can be found in Appendix A.1.
1.4.2 Panel Regression
To quantify the global impacts of the US fire sales during the GFC, I estimate
the following specifications:
Inflowi,t =αi + βln(VIXt) + εi,t (1.12)
Consumption Growthi,t =αi + β1ln(VIXt) + β2ln(VIXt)× Inflowi,t−2 + εi,t (1.13)
ln(Real Exchange Ratei,t) =αi + β1ln(VIXt) + β2ln(VIXt)× Inflowi,t−1 + εi,t (1.14)
where αi is the country fixed effects, and VIXt a measure of global risk as stan-
dard in the literature. Inflowi,t is the gross capital inflows from the US in country
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i, scaled by output. Consumption Growthi,t is year-on-year log-difference of real
consumption, and Real Exchange Ratei,t is the real exchange rate denoted as the
US dollar price of foreign currency in country i. Equation (1.12) estimates how
the gross inflows from the US in foreign countries comove with the VIXt. Equation
(1.13) and (1.14) estimate the impacts of capital inflows from the US on foreign
countries’ consumption growth and exchange rate in responses to VIXt fluctuations.
The inflows are lagged to ensure exogeneity.17 The model is estimated in two sample
periods: the whole sample period from 2003Q1 to 2018Q4 and the GFC period from
2007Q4 to 2009Q2. I use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors to control for
heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-sectional correlation.
Table 1.3 reports the coefficients of interest β and β2 in the specifications above.
The first two columns show that the US will retrench its capital flows from overseas
when the global economic uncertainty rises, both in the whole sample and in the
GFC period. On average, a 10% increase in VIX is associated with a 0.21% decline
of gross capital inflows from the US as a fraction of output in foreign countries.
The capital retrenchment in the US is larger in the GFC period, around 0.32%.
According to the model predictions, the capital retrenchment in the US will lead to
a consumption growth decline and a currency depreciation in foreign countries, and
the coefficients of the intersection term in Equation (1.13) and (1.14) are expected
to be positive. As shown in columns (3) to (6), the sign of the coefficients on the
intersection term is significantly positive in both specifications. The capital stop in
17The inflows are lagged two periods for the consumption growth to reflect the slow-moving
feature of the consumption dynamics.
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foreign countries will result in a real consumption growth decline and a currency
depreciation, which echos the model predictions.
Gross Inflows from US Real Consumption Growth Real Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(VIXt) -0.0321
∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0466∗∗ -0.0104 -0.146∗∗∗ 0.0645∗
(0.0145) (0.0073) (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0143) (0.0370)
ln(VIXt) × Inflowi,t−2 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0069)
ln(VIXt) × Inflowi,t−1 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.1025∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0249)
Observations 105 956 105 920 105 941
GFC Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the panel regression results from estimating Equation (1.12), (1.13), and
(1.14). I use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-
sectional correlation, shown in the parentheses. The data is from the IMF IFS and BEA. This
table shows that a rise in VIXt is accompanied by a capital stop in foreign countries, which has a
significant negative impact on foreign countries’ consumption growth and currency value.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.3: Panel Regression Results
1.4.3 VAR Estimation
In this part, I estimate the dynamic responses of foreign countries’ capital
inflows, consumption and exchange rate employing a VAR model. The structural
VAR model is given by




where ai is a vector of country fixed effects and εi,t is an n× 1 vector of structural
residuals with E[εi,tε
′
i,t] = I and E[εtε
′
s] = 0 for s 6= t, where I is the identity matrix.
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The reduced form representation can then be written as




where S = A−1, ci = Sai, βj = Sαj, and uit = Sεit is the vector of reduced-
form shocks with covariance matrix E[uitu
′
it] = SS
′ = Σµ. The matrix S maps the
structural shocks into the reduced-form residuals.
In the baseline specification, I estimate a five-variable VAR including the VIX,
the US and foreign countries’ real consumption, real exchange rate, and the gross
inflows from the US in foreign countries scaled by foreign output. All variables
(except inflows) are in log-levels so that movements in the variables are in percentage
points. I identify the structural shocks through a recursive identification strategy,
and thus S is the Cholesky decomposition of Σµ. I order VIX first and then the
US consumption, gross inflows from the US in foreign countries, real exchange rate,
and foreign consumption, shown in Equation (1.15). The ordering follows Benigno
et al. (2012) and assumes that volatility shocks have contemporaneous effects on the











Figure 1.7 presents the impulse responses of key variables for up to eight
quarters to a one standard deviation increase in VIX. The starred lines are the two
standard deviation bands using the delta method. The VIX gradually decays within
the first two years after the shock as shown in the top-left panel. In the top-right
panel, a rise in VIX results in a sharp short-lived capital stop in foreign countries as
the US retrenches its overseas investment but it quickly vanishes. In the bottom-left
panel, the real consumption in both the US and RoW declines in response to a VIX
increase. However, the real consumption in the RoW declines more than in the US
Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of VIX, the gross capital inflows in foreign coun-
tries from the US, the US and foreign countries’ real consumption, and real exchange rate to a
one standard increase in VIX. The starred lines are the two standard deviation bands calculated
using the delta method. The optimal lag in the VAR is set to be 2 based on Schwarz information
criterion. The structural shock is identified through a recursive identification. The figure implies a
capital retrenchment in the US during a crisis, associated with a deeper consumption decline and
a currency depreciation in foreign countries.
Figure 1.7: Impulse Responses to VIX
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and the difference reaches over 0.3% within two years after a one std increase in
VIX. The bottom-right panel shows the responses of real exchange rate in the RoW.
After a positive VIX shock, the foreign currency depreciates in the subsequent six
quarters. The results show that a one standard variation increase in VIX will lead to
a capital retrenchment in the US, a deeper consumption decline in foreign countries
relative to the US, and a foreign currency depreciation. The results are invariant to
alternative VAR specifications reported in Figure A.6 in Appendix A.2.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a two-country two-goods open economy model with
asymmetric financial development levels. The key innovation is to introduce a milder
financial constraint in the US in an international context. The model investigates
the interactions between financial sectors across countries when both of them are
financially constrained and studies the role of financial frictions in intentional finan-
cial contagion, risk-sharing, and exchange rate dynamics during a crisis. The model
predictions are consistent with the global consumption, exchange rate, and external
account dynamics during the GFC.
The model is highly stylized. The US dollar appreciation responses in the
model are far from matching the magnitude in the data although the direction is
correct. Also, the government and the international risk-free asset market are absent
in the model. The contribution of this paper is to shed light on the role of the US
in the international financial system. The advanced financial development level in
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the US is a double-edged sword. It means lower financial risk in tranquil times
but a soaring risk during a crisis. However, it always works in favor of the US in
the international economy. The US consistently enjoys higher relative consumption
through the business cycles. A relevant question would be are there any costs for
this exorbitant privilege? If yes, what are these costs? I leave these questions for
future research.
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Chapter 2: Credit Supply and Firm Investment
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between the credit market and the real economy has been
one of the core topics in macroeconomics, especially after the Great Recession. This
paper studies how firm investment responds to credit supply shocks conditional on
firm characteristics in the US in the past three decades. How would firms respond to
credit supply shocks? Would firm characteristics induce heterogeneous responses to
the shocks? And more importantly, are the heterogeneous firm responses dependent
on credit cycle phases? These questions are of great importance yet challenging to
answer within the existing literature framework. The strand of literature based on
event study or fixed effect approach can provide micro-level evidence on the effects
of credit supply shocks. However, the event study approach can only focus on a
specific period around an economically significant event such as a financial crisis,
while the fixed effect approach identifies an idiosyncratic credit supply shock that is
isomorphic to the common credit supply shock. There is another strand of literature
identifying credit supply shocks within a VAR structure. Research along this line
focuses on the aggregate implications of credit supply shocks and does not provide
evidence on the firm-level responses.
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This paper revisits these questions employing a joint approach based on the
two strands of literature above. I identify a series of credit supply shocks from a sign
restriction VAR and then apply the identified shock to firm-level data, to investigate
the heterogeneity and state-dependence of firm investment responses. This paper
inherits merits from both strands of literature and the advantage is twofold: first, I
can extract a series of credit supply shocks that are common to the banking sector
over a long horizon, and study the state-dependence of firm heterogeneous responses
to the shocks, which is complementary to the first strand of literature; second, I
provide micro evidence on the effects of credit supply shocks using firm-level data,
which is absent in the second strand of literature.
My identification strategy builds on a growing strand of literature employing
sign restriction VAR in identifying credit supply shocks and studying their real ef-
fects. This paper is different in three dimensions. First, I distinguish between house-
hold and corporate credit. The existing literature identifies credit supply shocks
using aggregate credit volume including both household and corporate credit (Hris-
tov et al. (2012) is an exception). However, as documented in Beck et al. (2012);
Mian et al. (2017, 2020), credit granted to households and firms will have different
impacts on the economy and operate via different mechanisms. More importantly,
to document the firm-level responses to the identified credit supply shock, it would
be problematic if I identify the shocks incorporating household credit. Second, I
measure credit price using excess bond premium constructed in Gilchrist and Za-
krajsek (2012a) rather than either the loan rate or credit spread typically used in
the literature. There are several advantages in using excess bong premium: it has
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a longer horizon and broader coverage of credit rating quality, addresses the matu-
rity mismatch in measuring credit spread, and takes out the default risk from the
firm side. Third, I investigate the effects of the identified credit supply shock using
firm-level data. The exogeneity of the identified credit supply shock is guaranteed
by construction in the structural model. And the credit supply shock extracted
from the structural VAR is common to the whole banking sector and covers a long
horizon since the 1970s including both expansions and contractions, which enables
me to study the heterogeneity and state-dependence of firm investment responses.
One concern about the identification strategy is what on earth is the shock
identified from this structural model and how to assure it is not contaminated by
other factors. To be crystal-clear, the credit supply shock identified from the struc-
tural VAR is exogenous innovations that originate within the financial sector and
are independent to either aggregate structural shocks or monetary policy shocks.
I impose credit volume and credit price to move in opposite directions to isolate
credit supply shocks from credit demand and other aggregate shocks. To distin-
guish between the credit supply shock and the credit channel of monetary policy
shock, I assume monetary policy rate and credit volume move in the same direction
in the identification, i.e., monetary policy tightens in response to a credit expan-
sion and relaxes to a credit contraction. Thus, the identified credit supply shock is
mutually exclusive to the credit channel of monetary policy shock and captures the
fluctuations of the credit market that are not induced by monetary policy shocks.
This identification strategy reflects two key distinctions between the credit supply
shock and the monetary policy shock: first, the former is a real shock while the
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latter is a nominal shock; second, the former is accompanied by a counter-cyclical
monetary policy rate movement. For example, a credit expansion is accompanied by
a monetary policy tightening and thus an increase of funding cost for the banking
sector. The credit supply shock can originate from many sources, ranging from un-
expected changes in banking sector regulation, technology, degree of competition, to
risk aversion. From the perspective of structural models, one can think of the credit
supply shock as innovations to banking sector financial constraints, net worth, or
credit risk.
The firm-level data in this paper is from Compustat, a widely used data set
with rich balance-sheet information for public firms in the US. And the main empir-
ical results in this paper rely on the local projection method prominently advocated
by Jorda (2005). The local projection method has been extended to large panel data
recently as in Drechsel (2019); Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018); Ottonello and Winberry
(2020). Methodology-wise, this paper follows this strand of emerging literature.
Local projection is more robust to model misspecification, easy to implement, and
conceptually identical to VAR estimation (Mikkel and Wolf (Forthcoming)). More
importantly, it is computationally challenging to estimate a VAR model when it
comes to a large panel data set as the one used in this paper. Therefore, the local
projection method serves as a perfect alternative approach to estimate the dynamic
responses of firm investment to exogenous shocks. The novel part in this paper is
twofold: first, I estimate the firm investment responses to a different shock – credit
supply shock; second, I document that the heterogeneous responses of firm invest-
ment are state-dependent on credit expansions and contractions, a fact that has
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been overlooked in the literature.1
This paper documents two main results. First, the identified credit supply
shock has significant and persistent impacts on both macro variables and firm-level
investment. On the aggregate side, one unit of a credit supply shock (0.39% move-
ment in credit volume) leads to a 0.73% movement of output, 0.46% of consumption,
2.4% of investment, and -0.3% of the unemployment rate at the peak. On the firm-
level side, one unit credit supply shock induces a 0.21% movement of firm investment
on impact on average. The effect gradually grows over time and reaches above 1%
five quarters after the shock and remains significant for around ten quarters. Al-
though the impacts of credit supply shocks are quantitatively big and significant,
one should take the specific numbers cautiously since the identification strategy is
based on simulations.
Second, the heterogeneous firm investment responses to the credit supply shock
are state-dependent. The investment of low default risk firms will increase more rel-
ative to average firms during a credit expansion and decline less during a credit con-
traction. Specifically, firms with one standard deviation higher distance-to-default
will expand their investment 1% more than average firms to one unit of a positive
credit supply shock, and contract 1.5% less to one unit of a negative shock. Overall,
low default risk firms will always be better off through credit cycles, a larger increase
in investment during credit expansions, and a smaller decline during credit contrac-
tions. In addition, I inspect the mechanism of the state-dependent heterogeneous
1Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) study the 2008 global financial crisis; Drechsel (2019) looks at
the investment shock; and Cloyne et al. (2018); Jeenas (2018); Ottonello and Winberry (2020)
investigate the monetary policy shock.
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effects and find that low default risk firms have consistently low borrowing costs and
better access to external financing over credit cycles. This state-dependence of het-
erogeneous effects also applies to larger, older, and less volatile firms. However, the
heterogeneous effects will disappear when estimating using the entire data sample.
This finding has important implications on both the empirical and theoretical
sides for future research. On the empirical side, it suggests that the insignificance
of heterogeneous responses of firm investment to exogenous shocks conditional on
firm characteristics during the entire sample period might be misleading. It con-
ceals the fact that the state-dependent heterogeneous responses have flipped signs
and commensurate magnitudes in credit expansions and contractions. On the theo-
retical side, it is consistent with the insights of financial friction literature, arguing
that firms with higher default risk will be more negatively impacted during credit
contractions. Nevertheless, it also suggests that this effect is nonlinear and state-
dependent. Financial frictions do not systematically amplify or dampen exogenous
shocks. Instead, they will amplify the effects of negative shocks, and dampen the
effects of positive shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 elaborates the credit supply shock identification strategy,
presents the identified shock series, and provides evidence on its implications on
aggregate macro variables. Section 2.4 discusses the firm-level data and firm variable
constructions in detail. Section 2.5 reports the main empirical results of this paper.
And section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, I contribute to the
literature studying the real effects of credit supply shocks. There are four approaches
in identifying credit supply shocks: event study, granular method, credit spread, and
VAR estimation. First, the event study approach identifies a credit expansion via a
bank deregulation period and a credit contraction via either bank liquidity tightening
or a recession period.2 Compared to this strand of literature, I can extract a series
of credit supply shocks over a long horizon and investigate the state-dependence of
the real effects of credit supply shocks. Second, the granular method isolates credit
shocks on the supply side from the demand side by controlling for bank and firm
fixed effects using detailed loan-level data and is widely used in countries where
the data is available.3 Greenstone et al. (2020) uses county-level data in the US
employing a similar approach. Becker and Ivashina (2014) use Compustat data and
interpret firms’ switching from loans to bonds as a contraction in bank credit supply.
My paper is complementary to this strand of literature in two dimensions: first, I
identify a common credit supply shock while they focus on a bank- or firm-specific
idiosyncratic shock; second, I provide the firm-level evidence in response to credit
supply shocks using the US data. Third, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a,b); Gilchrist
2See Favara and Imbs (2015); Mian et al. (2017) for credit expansions in the US during 2000s
and 1980s; Chodorow-Reich (2013); Cingano et al. (2016); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008); Duchin et al.
(2010); Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010); Iyer et al. (2013); Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018); Kashyap
et al. (1994); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Lemmon and Roberts (2010); Rojas (2018); Schnabl (2012)
for credit contractions during bank liquidity crisis or recessions.
3For example, see Khwaja and Mian (2008) for Pakistan, Amiti and Weinstein (2018) for Japan,
Degryse et al. (2019) for Belgium, Alfaro et al. (2020) for Spain, and Doerr et al. (2018) for Italy.
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et al. (2009b) have a series of papers employing credit spread as an indicator of
credit supply shocks. In contrast to their work, the credit supply shock in my paper
is identified by combining information from both credit price and credit volume.
Lastly, my paper is mostly related to the emerging strand of literature identifying
credit supply shocks employing sign restriction VAR.4 I employ the sign restriction
VAR identification approach for two reasons: first, it is hard to defend the recursive
ordering of endogenous variables when the model contains both real and financial
variables; second, Mumtaz et al. (2018) show that sign restriction identification can
generate consistent impulse responses from the model-simulated data with those
directly from the model, and deliver better performance than recursive identification
in identifying credit supply shocks.5 The sign restriction choices are guided by
theoretical models featuring financial intermediaries.6 I contribute to this strand
of literature by applying the identified credit supply shock into firm-level data and
investigate the heterogeneity and state-dependence of the real effects of credit supply
shocks.
Second, this paper is related to the literature studying how firm activities
respond to exogenous shocks or comove with business cycles conditional on firm
characteristics. Most of the former literature focuses on the heterogeneous effects
in response to monetary policy shocks and finds that firm responses depend on size,
4See Barnett and Thomas (2013); Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2014); Eickmeier and Ng (2015);
Furlanetto et al. (2017); Gambetti and Musso (2017); Helbling et al. (2011); Hristov et al. (2012);
Moccero et al. (2014); Peersman (2012).
5See Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018); Musso et al. (2011) for recursive identification.
6For example, Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008); Christiano et al. (2010); Curdia and Woodford
(2010); Gerali et al. (2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gilchrist et al. (2009a).
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age, leverage, liquidity, or default risk.7 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) doc-
ument that large firms have a disproportionate response, relative to small firms,
to deviations of unemployment rate. Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020) find that sales
of small firms are more cyclically sensitive over business cycles. Complementary
to these works, I study the heterogeneous responses of firm activities to a differ-
ent structural shock – credit supply shock. Also, I find that the heterogeneous
responses are state-dependent. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) also noticed that small
firms contract more to a monetary tightening during recessions but the effect is not
significant during booms. Ottonello and Winberry (2020) argue that low default
risk firms are more responsive to monetary policy shocks independent of monetary
expansions or contractions. On the theoretical side, existing models rely on combin-
ing heterogeneous agents and financial frictions to match the heterogeneity of firm
responses documented in the data.8 My work provides empirical evidence in sup-
port of their theories yet also proposes new challenges in generating state-dependent
heterogeneous responses.
Third, the state-dependent heterogeneous responses documented in this pa-
per is related to the strand of literature investigating the asymmetry of business
cycles or monetary policy effects. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016); Vavra (2013) find
that monetary policy is less effective in stimulating investment and output during
recessions or when the volatility is high. Caggiano et al. (2017) find similar results
analyzing the effects of uncertainty shocks and monetary policy jointly. Berger and
7See Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2020); Bougheas et al. (2006); Cloyne et al. (2018); Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994); Jeenas (2018); Ottonello and Winberry (2020).
8See Bassetto et al. (2015); Buera and Karmakar (2019); Buera and Moll (2015); Buera et al.
(2015); Khan and Thomas (2013); Khan et al. (2016); Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2020).
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Vavra (2015) show that durable purchases are less sensitive to subsidies during re-
cessions. Caggiano et al. (2014) find that the response of unemployment conditional
on recessions is substantially larger to uncertainty shocks. In recent work, Cheng
and Chiu (2020) document that mortgage spread shocks hitting in a recessionary
phase create significantly deeper and more protracted declines in consumption and
housing market than in an expansionary phase in the US. Different from the focus of
the above literature on the aggregate economy, my work documents the asymmetry
of heterogeneous effects to credit supply shocks using firm-level data.
2.3 Credit Supply Shock Identification
The key challenge in identifying the credit supply shock is to successfully sep-
arate it from other structural shocks. As shown in a highly-stylized credit market
structure in Figure 2.1, firms are on the demand side while both financial intermedi-
aries and monetary authority are on the supply side. The first challenge is to isolate
credit shocks on the supply side from the demand side using aggregate data. For
example, when the credit market is hit by a negative shock, it is often impossible
to tell whether it is because the firms are unwilling to borrow or the banks are un-
willing to lend. Besides, the credit market will propagate and amplify the monetary
policy shock through the credit channel. How to separate credit supply shocks from
monetary policy shocks? Also, how to disentangle credit supply shocks from other
aggregate structural shocks, such as aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and TFP









Figure 2.1: Credit Market Structure
will also influence the credit market through various channels.
In this section, I will first describe the econometric models and data used to
identify the credit supply shock. Then I will provide evidence that the credit supply
shock is well-identified and is not contaminated by other structural shocks.
2.3.1 Identification Strategy
2.3.1.1 Sign Restriction VAR
I identify credit supply shocks using sign restriction VAR proposed by Uhlig
(2005). The advent of the sign restriction VAR approach brings a new tool that
could be used to disentangle the credit supply shock from other structural shocks
using aggregate data and has been employed in an emerging strand of literature
studying the aggregate effects of credit supply shocks.
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where Yt is a n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, A and Bk are n × n coeffi-
cient matrix, and εt is a n×1 vector of structural shocks we seek to identify (Ramey
(2016)). εt is assumed to be i.i.d, orthogonal, and standardized such that E[εtε′t] = I,
E[ε′tεs] = 0 for s 6= t, where I is identity matrix. The exogeneity of the structural
shocks εt are guaranteed by construction in the structural VAR model. For simplic-
ity, I further assume that each element of εt only affects one equation, i.e., only one
of the elements to be one and all the rest zero.





where Fk = A
−1Bk and µt = A
−1εt, which is the reduced-form estimation residual.
Due to the symmetry of the covariance matrix Σµ = E[µtµ′t] = A−1A−1′, the identi-
fication problem in VAR estimation is to put extra restrictions in identifying A−1,
and then map between the reduced-form residuals µt and structural shocks εt we
are interested in. The insight of sign restriction VAR is to simulate the estimated
VAR by an orthogonal random matrix S (E[SS ′] = I and A−1 = PS, where P
is the Cholesky decomposition of Σµ), and keep the ones that make the impulse
responses of key variables consistent with the sign restrictions we impose. The sign
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restriction choices are usually guided by economic intuitions or theories. We keep
simulating the random draws of S until we get enough draws that satisfy the sign re-
strictions. Compared to recursive identification, sign restriction identification avoids
the causal ordering of endogenous variables which is often hard to defend, especially
when financial variables are involved as in this paper. Also, Mumtaz et al. (2018)
show that sign restriction identification delivers better performance than recursive
identification in identifying credit supply shocks.
2.3.1.2 Sign Restriction Choices
In the benchmark identification VAR, I employ a four-variable VAR including
credit volume, credit price, output, and monetary policy rate as the endogenous
variables. For the credit volume, I use nonfinancial corporate business credit from
the US Financial Account.9 Nonfinancial corporate business credit includes public
firms and large private firms that are active both in the loan and corporate bond
market. Therefore, the identified credit supply shock captures the exogenous fluc-
tuations in the corporate credit market and is valid to match with the Compustat
data. For the credit price, I use Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a) excess bond pre-
mium following Gertler and Karadi (2015). There are several advantages of the
excess bond premium over other credit price measures. First, the excess bond pre-
mium has a longer horizon since 1973 while other widely used credit spreads, such
as Moody’s AAA-treasury or BAA-treasury spread, start in the 1980s. Second, the
maturity mismatch problem is also well-addressed, since the excess bond premium
9I take out commercial mortgages to match the credit price.
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is constructed by matching with synthetic risk-free security that mimics exactly the
cash flows of the corresponding corporate debt instrument. Third, it covers the
entire spectrum of credit quality – from single D to triple A. Lastly, the default risk
from the firm side is carefully taken off from the spread. By construction, the excess
bond premium is the component of the spread between rates of return on corporate
securities and a similar maturity risk-free rate that is left after the component due to
default risk is removed. Therefore, the fluctuations of the credit price are not caused
by the risk premium imposed on the firms. The output is real GDP from BEA and
the monetary policy rate is the federal funds rate. The details of the aggregate data
used in the benchmark identification can be found in Appendix B.1.1.
The sign restriction choices are mostly guided by the theoretical models featur-
ing financial intermediaries.10 Intuitively, I assume that credit supply innovations
drive credit volume and credit price in opposite directions, which is a sufficient con-
dition for separating credit supply shocks from credit demand shocks. As implied by
the structural literature, a credit expansion would also boost the output. Therefore,
I further assume that credit volume and output will move in the same direction.
Next, I will elaborate on how to isolate credit supply shocks from monetary
policy shocks. As shown in both theoretical and empirical works, monetary au-
thority will endogenously respond to credit shocks. On the theoretical side, as
implied in Curdia and Woodford (2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gilchrist et al.
(2009a), a credit expansion will lead to an economic boom, and therefore, monetary
10Gambetti and Musso (2017); Hristov et al. (2012) provide excellent summaries of model pre-
dictions on credit supply shocks in the structural literature.
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authority will respond by raising the policy rate. On the empirical side, Caldara
and Herbst (2019) document a negative elasticity between corporate spread and
monetary policy. They find that an increase in corporate spread, measured by
BAA-treasury spread, elicits an immediate monetary policy accommodation. To
put it another way, monetary policy moves in a counter-cyclical pattern in response
to credit shocks. When there is a credit expansion, credit price declines, and output
increases, meanwhile, the monetary policy rate will also rise. In contrast, a credit
and real activity boom induced by a monetary expansion will be accompanied by
a policy rate decline. As a result, assuming the same signs on credit volume and
policy rate would allow us to uniquely identify credit supply shocks from monetary
policy shocks.11 Table 2.1 summarizes the sign restrictions in the benchmark iden-
tification VAR. The intuition of the imposed sign restrictions operates as follows:
when there is a positive credit supply shock, credit volume expands and credit price
declines. This will lead to an output boom and as a result, monetary authority will
tighten the policy rate. To alleviate the concern that monetary authority might
behave slowly in response to credit supply shocks, the sign restrictions are imposed
for four quarters. This is consistent with Hristov et al. (2012); Uhlig (2017), which
argue that the effects of real shocks on the economy can be quite persistent.
11An impression about the relationship between credit spread and the monetary policy rate
is that they are highly positively correlated. However, it is not always the case. As shown in
Figure B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B.2, there are deviations between the excess bond premium
changes and the monetary policy rate changes, and the moving correlation between the monetary
policy rate and the excess bond premium is not always positive and significant. This identification
reasoning is also supported by the data. As shown in the Figure B.2 in Appendix B.2, I only
impose sign restrictions on credit volume, credit price, and output as specified above, and leave
the sign restrictions on the monetary policy rate open. The median impulse response of the federal
funds rate moves up in response to a credit expansion though not significantly.
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Variables Credit Volume Credit Price Output Monetary Policy Rate
Sign Restrictions + – + +
Note: This table summarizes the sign restrictions imposed on the benchmark identification for the
case of an expansionary credit supply shock. Credit volume is the nonfinancial corporate business
credit after removing commercial mortgages from the US financial Account and is deflated by
CPI. Credit price is the excess bond premium constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a) and
updated by Favara et al. (2016). The output is GDP deflated by GDP deflator from BEA. The
monetary policy rate is the federal funds rate. The sign restrictions are imposed for four quarters.
Table 2.1: Sign Restrictions
The above argument explains how the benchmark identification could separate
credit supply shocks from credit demand shocks and monetary policy shocks. Since
the benchmark VAR has four variables, and I can identify up to four structural
shocks. Yet I only identify one credit supply shock and leave other structural shocks
unidentified. How is the benchmark identification able to prevent contamination
from other aggregate structural shocks, such as aggregate demand, aggregate supply,
or productivity shocks? The underlying assumption is that both households and
firms are on the demand side of the credit market. Therefore, whether it is an
aggregate demand shock happening in the household sector, or an aggregate supply
shock or TFP shock happening in the production sector, they both operate through
the demand side of the credit market. As a result, the opposite signs on the credit
volume and credit price will exclude the above aggregate shocks in this specification.
At the end of this section, I will show that the identified credit supply shock has
no implications on the price level, housing price, and productivity to exclude the
possibility that the identified credit supply shock is contaminated by either monetary
policy shocks or other aggregate structural shocks.
After specifying the identification strategy, we can now discuss what the credit
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supply shock that we are identifying is and where it comes from. As implied by the
sign restrictions, the credit supply shock and the credit channel of monetary policy
shock are mutually exclusive in the benchmark identification. The credit expansion
induced by monetary expansion would be the case where monetary rate and credit
volume moving in opposite directions. Instead, the identified credit supply shock
falls in the case where credit volume and monetary rate are moving in the same
direction. Therefore, we are identifying exogenous credit fluctuations that are not
caused by monetary policy movements. The credit supply shock can be associated
with various events. It could be the unexpected tightening or relaxing of banking
sector regulations; unanticipated changes in bank funding such as a bank run or a
systematic financial crisis; unexpected changes in risk aversion or lending standards
due to management or technology adoptions; or unexpected changes of the degree
of competition in the banking sector. However, the restrictions imposed on the
aggregate data could only enable us to identify exogenous shocks in the corporate
credit supply as opposed to endogenous reactions of corporate lending to other
structural shocks but will not allow us to disentangle the specific reasons of the
credit supply shock listed above. In the structural literature, the credit supply
shock is often associated with unexpected changes in financial constraints such as
Buera and Moll (2015); Jermann and Quadrini (2012), in financial sector net worth
such as Gerali et al. (2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011), or in credit risk such as
Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008); Christiano et al. (2010); Gilchrist et al. (2009a).
One last note on the benchmark identification strategy is about the price
level. I do not impose restrictions on price levels for two reasons. First, the struc-
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tural models make inconsistent predictions on the responses of inflation to credit
supply shocks. For example, Curdia and Woodford (2010); Gertler and Karadi
(2011); Gilchrist et al. (2009a) predict an inflation caused by credit expansion while
Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008); Gerali et al. (2010) predict the opposite. Second, as
argued in Mian et al. (2017, 2020), credit supply shock may operate through either
production capacity channel or local demand channel, where the former is defla-
tionary while the latter is inflationary. Moreover, unlike other literature which uses
both household and corporate credit (except Hristov et al. (2012)), I only include
corporate credit in the credit volume and the impact of credit supply shocks on the
price level is less clear. As suggested in Uhlig (2017), if you do not know it, do not
impose it! I do not impose any sign restrictions on the price level in the benchmark
model and leave the identification including price level for robustness check. This
is consistent with Eickmeier and Ng (2015); Hristov et al. (2012) who also leave the
sign restrictions in price level open to credit supply shocks. Overall, my benchmark
identification strategy is the same as in Hristov et al. (2012) since we both only use
corporate credit. The difference is that they also identify other aggregate structural
shocks while I only identify one credit supply shock.
2.3.2 Credit Supply Shocks
I estimate the sign restriction VAR following the algorithm in Rubio-Ramirez
et al. (2010).12 The credit volume and the GDP are in real terms and log-levels.
12For details, refer to Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010); Uhlig (2005) and the VAR toolbox developed
by Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi.
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The excess bond premium and federal fund rate are in percentage points. The lag
of the VAR model is set to be 3 quarters following the Akaike information criterion
(AIC). I keep 1000 successful draws that satisfy the sign restrictions in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.2 shows the identified credit supply shock extracted from the bench-
mark identification VAR. One unit of a credit supply shock corresponds to one stan-
dard deviation movement of credit volume (0.39% of corporate credit). The iden-
tified credit supply shock starts from 1973Q4 until 2018Q4. Notably, each NBER
recession is accompanied by a negative credit supply shock in the past 45 years. The
three largest negative credit supply shock periods occurred in 1980, 2002, and 2007–
2008. The negative spike in 1980 is mainly due to the 1980 recession and monetary
policy fluctuations; the negative shock in 2002 is largely determined by the spike in
the credit spread; the largest negative shocks happened during the Great Recession
Note: This figure displays the identified credit supply shock extracted from the benchmark iden-
tification VAR from 1973Q4 to 2018Q4. The solid line is the median of valid credit supply shock
and the dotted lines are the 68% confidence interval. The shaded area is the NBER recession.
The unit of the credit supply shock is in standard deviations of credit volume. The benchmark
identification successfully captures the negative credit supply shocks in each NBER recession.
Figure 2.2: Identified Credit Supply Shocks
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when the whole financial sector in the US collapsed. The confidence interval tracks
the median value of the credit supply shock closely in a narrow band, indicating the
benchmark model is stable and well-specified. I will use the median credit supply
shock for the rest of the analysis.
One of the advantages of identifying credit supply shocks using VAR structure
is that the identified shocks are measured in multiple dimensions, associated with
both credit volume and price, and other key macro variables. Figure 2.3 displays
the impulse responses of macro variables to credit supply shocks in the benchmark
identification for up to 40 quarters. In response to one unit of a positive credit
Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to one unit of a
positive credit supply shock in the benchmark identification. The solid line is the median impulse
response and the shaded area is the 68% confidence interval. The sign restrictions are imposed for
four quarters. This figure shows the significant and persistent effects of credit supply shocks on
macro variables beyond the restricted periods.
Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to Credit Supply Shocks
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supply shock, nonfinancial corporate business credit increases 0.39% on impact and
then gradually rises to over 2% ten quarters after the shock; excess bond premium
declines 0.15% and then quickly bounces back; the output increases 0.29% on impact
and reaches 0.7% five quarters after the shock; the federal funds rate rises 0.4% and
then gradually decays. The credit supply shock has significant and large effects on
the aggregate economy. The sign restrictions are imposed for four quarters yet the
effects are persistent and hold much longer than the restricted periods.
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the identified credit supply shock.
As shown in Panel (A), the mean of the credit supply shocks is around zero, and
there are slightly more positive shocks than negative shocks. Overall, the credit
expansions and contractions are approximately symmetric over the past 45 years.
Panel (B) displays the correlation of the identified credit supply shock with widely
used high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks. The first monetary policy
shock measure follows Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016); Gurkaynak et al. (2005),
Panel (A): Summary Statistics
Time Mean Median S.D. Min Max Expansions Contractions
1973Q4 – 2018Q4 0.0035 0.0650 0.848 -2.9214 2.2748 97 84
Panel (B): Correlation with HFI Monetary Policy Shock
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)
(1990-2009) (1995–2013)
Correlation -0.1825 -0.0454
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the identified credit supply shock from 1973Q4
to 2018Q4. Panel (A) reports the simple summary statistics, and Panel (B) reports the correla-
tion between the identified credit supply shock and the high-frequency identified monetary policy
shocks. The monetary policy shock is normalized so that a positive shock is a monetary expansion.
The identified credit supply shock is approximately symmetric in expansions and contractions in
the past 45 years and are barely correlated with monetary policy shocks.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Credit Supply Shocks
72
and the second measure follows Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). The high-frequency
monetary policy shocks are aggregated into quarterly series after adjustment for the
timing of FOMC announcement as in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016); Ottonello
and Winberry (2020). I normalize the sign of the monetary policy shocks so that
a policy rate cut is a positive monetary shock. The correlation between the credit
supply shock and monetary policy shocks is low and slightly negative, implying that
the credit supply shock identified in the paper is a different structural shock from
the monetary policy shock.
To assess the predictive power of the identified credit supply shock, I present
Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of additional macro variables based on the bench-
mark identification. The solid line is the median impulse response and the shaded area is the
68% confidence interval. The consumption is deflated personal consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods and services, and investment is deflated gross private investment. Productivity is
utilization-adjusted TFP from Fernald (2014) and real housing price is from Shiller (2015). This
figure shows that the identified credit supply shock has no implications for the price level, hous-
ing price, and productivity, implying that the identified shock is not contaminated by aggregate
demand/supply or monetary policy shocks.
Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses of Other Macro Variables to Credit Supply Shocks
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the impulse responses of additional macro variables to the shocks, including con-
sumption, investment, unemployment rate, CPI, housing price, and utilization-
adjusted productivity. The details of the construction of the macro variables can be
found in Appendix B.1.1. I re-estimate the benchmark VAR by adding the macro
variables of interest one at a time, and leave the sign restriction on them open and let
it be determined by the data. The benchmark identification is robust to the inclusion
of additional macro variables and the behavior of benchmark variables is essentially
invariant. Thus, the sequence of VARs reveals the impulse responses of additional
macro variables, holding constant the behavior of variables in the benchmark identi-
fication. Figure 2.4 displays the impulse responses of the macro variables of interest.
In the top row, the consumption increases over 0.4% one year after one unit of a
credit supply shock (0.39% increase in corporate credit); investment rises over 2%
and unemployment declines around 0.3% within the same year of the credit supply
shock. The effects are significant for over 10 quarters for investment and unemploy-
ment, and for a much longer period, around 30 quarters, for consumption. Though
I do not impose any restrictions on these variables, the credit supply shock has large
and persistent effects on consumption, investment, and unemployment. The bottom
row shows the responses of the price level, housing price, and utilization-adjusted
productivity. None of the impulse responses are significant. If the benchmark identi-
fication for credit supply shocks is contaminated by aggregate demand or monetary
policy shocks, the CPI is supposed to rise in response to the structural shock; if
the identification fails to exclude aggregate supply shocks, the CPI should decline.
However, the price level barely moves in the short to medium run and the responses
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are imprecisely estimated lying in a wide confidence interval. Moreover, I study
two specific cases for aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks: housing price
and productivity. Similarly, both the housing price and productivity are not sig-
nificantly responsive to the identified credit supply shock, excluding the case that
the credit supply shock is misspecified with the aggregate demand shock from the
housing market or TFP shock from the supply side. Since monetary policy shocks
will only have short-term effects on real variables but long-term effects on price
levels, combining Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 together, the identified credit supply
shock has a persistent influence on real variables like output and consumption, and
a negligible impact on the price level, exactly the opposite of the implications of
monetary policy shocks. Overall, the benchmark identification is able to isolate the
credit supply shock from the demand side, and the identified credit supply shock
is not contaminated by either monetary policy shocks or other aggregate structural
shocks.
2.4 Firm-level Data
The firm-level data is drawn from quarterly Compustat, a long panel of pub-
licly listed firms in the US. It matches the data frequency of the identified credit
supply shock and is consistent with the credit data used in benchmark identifica-
tion, both of which mainly cover public and large private firms in the US. Most
importantly, it contains rich balance-sheet information, allowing me to construct a
variety of firm characteristic measures of interest. Though the Compustat data set
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is unsatisfactory in not including small private firms, it is the only available data set
that meets all the requirements above and serves the purpose of this paper well.13
The main response variable is the firm investment, measured by changes of
firm real capital stock. The book value of the firm capital stock is constructed
following a perpetual inventory method as commonly used in the literature.14 For
each firm i, the capital stock is recursively defined as
Ki,t = Ki,t−1 + PPENTQi,t − PPENTQi,t−1
where the initial value of capital stock Ki,t is set to be the first available value of
gross value of property, plant and equipment (PPEGTQi,t), and PPENTQi,t is firms’
net value of property, plant and equipment. I interpolate linearly for PPENTQi,t
wherever PPENTQi,t is missing and PPENTQi,t−1 and PPENTQi,t+1 are available.
Thus, the firm investment is defined as
∆log(ki,t) = log(ki,t)− log(ki,t−1)
where ki,t is real capital stock of firm i at the end of period t, constructed by deflating
Ki,t using nonfarm business sector implicit price deflator.
The main explanatory variables are firm characteristics measured by four vari-
13The main alternatives, covering a much broader set of firm sizes than Compustat, are Quarterly
Financial Reports as in Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020) and the LOCUS data set constructed in
Dinlersoz et al. (2018) (combining the US Census Longitudinal Business Database, Orbis, and
Compustat). However, Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020) only follow small firms for eight quarters,
while Dinlersoz et al. (2018) is at an annual frequency.
14See Jeenas (2018); Mongey and Williams (2016); Ottonello and Winberry (2020).
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ables: distance-to-default, size, age, and volatility.15 I will mainly focus on firm
default risk (distance-to-default) and leave the results on other firm characteristics
as robustness checks since the firm characteristics are endogenously interlinked and
generate consistent results.
The distance-to-default measures a firm’s possibility of default at each point
in time, developed in the seminal work of Merton (1974) and widely used in the
financial industry. Intuitively, it describes how far away a firm is from its default
point, which is the face value of its total debts. The key insight of this measure
of corporate credit risk is that the equity of a firm can be viewed as a call option
on the underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to the value of its
debts. Though neither the underlying value of a firm nor its volatility is directly
observable, they can be inferred from the value and volatility of a firm’s equity and
its capital structure, under certain assumptions. Suppose the value of a firm follows
a Brownian motion
dV = µV V dt+ σV V dW
where V denotes the total value of the firm, µV the expected continuously com-
pounded return on V , σV the volatility of the firm’s value, and dW an increment
of the standard Weiner process. Assume the firm has an outstanding debt of face
value D that will mature in T periods, then the value of the firm’s equity E can be
viewed as a call option on the underlying value of the firm V , with a strike price
15I leave firm leverage and liquidity in the appendix for two reasons: first, they do not show
state-dependence of heterogeneous responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks on impact;
second, the two measures are highly endogenous and generate counter-intuitive results in dynamic
estimations.
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equal to the face value of the firm’s debt D and a time to maturity of T . According
to the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing equation, the value of the firm’s equity
E satisfies
E = V Φ(δ1)− e−rTDΦ(δ2) (2.1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, Φ(·) is the cumulative standard normal distri-
bution function, and
δ1 =




, and δ2 = δ1 − σV
√
T
Following Ito’s Lemma, the relationship between the volatility of the firm’s value
σV and the volatility of its equity σE, within Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing





The value of firm equity E and its volatility σE, the face value of firm debt D,
and the risk-free interest rate r are observable from the data, and we end up with
two variables V and σV and two equations (2.1) and (2.2) that could be solved
numerically. The value of firm equity E is proxied by its market capitalization from
CRSP, and the value of firm debt is from the merged CRSP-Compustat data sample.
In addition, the forecasting horizon is set to be 1 year (T = 1). Thus, the risk-free
interest rate is the daily 1-year constant-maturity treasury rate, and the volatility of
firm equity is estimated by the standard deviation of the daily stock returns using
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a 250-day moving window. In the end, the firm’s distance-to-default is defined as
dd =
ln(V/D) + (µV − 0.5σ2V )
σV
A larger distance-to-default value means it needs a larger negative shock to drive a
firm into default. Therefore, a firm with a larger distance-to-default is considered to
have lower default risk. The detailed numerical techniques closely follows Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012a); Ottonello and Winberry (2020) and can be found in the
Appendix B.1.2.
The firm size and volatility are characterized by firm real sales following Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994); Ottonello and Winberry (2020). The firm size is defined as
the average real sales in the past 40 quarters in log-levels, and the firm volatility
is defined as the standard deviation of year-on-year real sales growth for the same
period. As for the firm age, I follow Cloyne et al. (2018) and measure firm age since
its year of incorporation, which is available from Datastream. A firm is classified
as mature if it exists for over 10 years or above, and young otherwise, following
Haltiwanger et al. (2013).
Other control variables include firm real total assets, real sales growth, and
firm current asset as a share of total assets. Both firm total assets and sales are
deflated by nonfarm business sector implicit price deflator. The firm real total asset
is in log-levels and the real sales growth is quarter-on-quarter. More details of the
construction of firm-level variables can be found in Appendix B.1.2.
I exclude financial (SIC code: 6000-6799), utility (SIC code: 4900 – 4999),
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and non-classifiable (SIC code: ≥ 9900) firms in the data sample. The firms are
kept in the sample if they are incorporated in the US and have observations for
more than 40 quarters. To eliminate the impacts from outlier observations, I drop
the firm-quarter observation and the subsequent observation if its capital, assets, or
sales is negative, leverage ratio higher than 10 or negative, liquidity ratio above 2
or below 0, quarterly real sales growth above 2 or below -2, or net current assets
as a share of total assets is higher than 10 or below -10. In order to remove the
extensive margins of firm investment movements, I drop firm-quarter observations
if the investment rate lies in the top and bottom 0.5% of the sample distribution, or
the acquisitions are larger than 5% of the total assets. Since the data on acquisitions
becomes available in late 1983 and there are only a few observations in 1984, in the
end, I keep the data sample from 1985Q1 to 2018Q4. This results in an unbalanced
panel of 331,812 firm-quarter observations in total. Appendix B.1.2 reports further
information about the data selection process.
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of the final firm-level data sample
used for the rest of the analysis. The top panel shows the simple summary statistics,
and the bottom panel shows the cross-section correlations of firm distance-to-default
with other firm characteristics. The average distance-to-default indicates that a 6
standard deviation negative shock in a given year will drive the average firm into
default, consistent with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a); Ottonello and Winberry
(2020). The median firm age is 16.5 years, indicating that over half of the firms will
be classified as mature based on the criterion described above. Indeed, only 27% of
the firms in the sample will be classified as young. The firms exhibit large volatility
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1985Q1–2018Q4 Dist. to Default Age Volatility Size Total Assets ∆ log kit
Mean 5.974 21.9 0.342 493.3 2351.1 0.004
Median 4.903 16.5 0.234 44.3 190.1 -0.004
S.D. 5.194 19.3 0.348 2301.09 10811.5 0.089
95th Percentile 15.558 59.5 1.032 2106.3 9580.2 0.123
Observations 231130 331812 331165 331812 331812 331812
corr(dd, ·) 1 0.231 -0.202 0.145 0.149 0.125
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: This table summarizes the firm-level variables from 1985Q1 to 2018Q4. In the top panel,
distance-to-default is constructed following Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a); age is in years since
firm incorporation; volatility is the 10-year standard deviation of firm year-on-year real sales
growth; size is the 10-year average of firm real sales; both total assets and size are in millions
of 2012 real US dollars; ∆ log kit is the log-difference of real capital stock. The bottom panel shows
the cross-section correlations between firm distance-to-default and other firm variables, with p-
values in parentheses.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Firm-level Data
measured by real sales growth. The average year-on-year real sales growth in the
sample is 0.05 and the standard deviation of the real sales growth within a 10-year
window is 0.342. The firm size and total assets are in millions of 2012 real US
dollars, and both of them are in levels for display here but will enter the regressions
in log-levels in the next section. Due to the usage of data mainly on public firms, the
firm size in the sample is large measured by either sales or total assets. The 10-year
average real sales are $493.3 million and the total assets are much larger, around
$2351.1 million, both of which exhibits considerable cross-section variations. The
median of firm size and total assets are far smaller, indicating that the distribution
of firm size is highly right-skewed. The response variable – firm investment, is
summarized in the last column. The average real capital growth is 0.4% and the
median -0.4% for the US public firms in the past thirty decades. The investment
also exhibits significant variations across firms, with a standard deviation of 8.9%.
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The first row in the bottom panel presents the cross-section correlations be-
tween the firm default risk and other variables, and the bottom row the correspond-
ing p-values. It implies that a low default risk firm tends to be large in either sales
or total assets, exist for a longer period, suffer smaller volatility, and experience a
faster investment growth. The full correlation matrix of firm variables is presented
in Table B.1 in Appendix B.1.2.
2.5 Empirical Panel Regression
In this section, I address the main question of this paper: how firms respond
to credit supply shocks conditional on their differential characteristics. I decompose
this question into two parts. First, I show that firm investment responds significantly
and persistently to the identified credit supply shock. It validates the approach
employed in this paper – applying the identified credit supply shock from a sign
restriction VAR using aggregate data to the firm-level data. Second and foremost,
I show that the differential responses of firm investment to the credit supply shock
conditional on firm characteristics are state-dependent. The firm with lower default
risk will increase their investment more during credit expansions, and contract their
investment less during credit contractions. I also investigate the mechanism of the
state-dependence of heterogeneous responses due to default risk. The results reveal
that low default risk firms consistently have lower borrowing costs and better access
to external financing through credit cycles. The results also hold for large, mature,
and less volatile firms. In the end, I will provide evidence that the results are robust
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to alternative credit supply shock identifications.
2.5.1 Average Firm Investment Responses
As a novel approach to apply the credit supply shock extracted from a VAR
structure to the firm-level data, I first provide some evidence that it is valid to
do so, by presenting the average firm investment responses to the identified credit
supply shock without considering firm heterogeneity. The impulse responses of firm
investment are estimated using the panel local projection method as specified below
∆logkit+h = αih + αsqh + βhεt + ΓhZit−1 + ΩhYt−1 + eith (2.3)
where the response variable on the left-hand side (LHS) is the cumulative firm in-
vestment over the forecast horizon h, and the coefficient of interest is βh measuring
how the cumulative firm investment ∆logkit+h in quarter t + h responds to the
credit supply shock εt in quarter t on average. I also include firm fixed effect αih
and sector-by-quarter fixed effect αsqh.
16 The former captures permanent differences
in investment behavior across firms, while the latter captures that across sectors and
seasons. The firm control variables Zit−1 include firm total assets, sales growth, cur-
rent assets as a share of total assets, and a fiscal quarter dummy. The aggregate
control variables Yit−1 is a vector with four lags of output growth, inflation, unem-
ployment rate, and eith is the residual. The firm control variables are standardized
16The sectors I consider, based on SIC codes, are: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining;
construction; manufacturing; transportation communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services;
wholesale trade; retail trade; and services.
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and the regression removes the Great Recession period. Throughout the analysis,
the standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels.
Figure 2.5 shows the average impulse responses of firm investment to credit
supply shocks for up to 20 quarters. On average, one unit of a credit supply shock
(0.39% movement of credit volume) induces a 0.21% movement of firm investment
on impact, and the effect slowly rises to over 1% after five quarters and stays for
another year. The effects on firm investment are significant and persistent for around
ten quarters after the shock. In Table B.3 in Appendix B.2, the impact of the
credit supply shock on firm investment remains positive and significant even after
controlling for individual firm characteristics. Also, the effects are robust to various
credit supply shock identifications as will be shown in section 2.5.3.2.
To offer an intuitive understanding of the magnitude of firm investment re-
Note: This figure displays the average impulse responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks.
The solid line is the impulse response and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. The
regression is controlled for firm fixed effects, section-by-quarter fixed effects, aggregate trends, and
the standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels. This figure shows that
the identified credit supply shock has a significant and persistent impact on firm investment.
Figure 2.5: Average Responses of Firm Investment to Credit Supply Shocks
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sponses to credit supply shocks, I compare the results above to Ottonello and Win-
berry (2020). Similar to this paper, they study the firm investment responses
to high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks using Compustat data from
1990Q1 to 2007Q4. As in Ottonello and Winberry (2020), the monetary policy
shock is constructed following Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016); Gurkaynak et al.
(2005). Besides, the monetary policy shock is normalized and standardized such
that a positive shock is a monetary expansion and the unit of monetary policy
shocks become standard deviations of federal funds rate. The average firm invest-
ment responses to monetary policy shocks and credit supply shocks are presented
in Figure 2.6. One unit of a monetary policy shock (11bp of federal funds rate)
induces a 0.19% firm investment movement on impact, but quickly decays after the
initial shock. In contrast, one unit of a credit supply shock (15bp of excess bond
premium) leads to a 0.22% firm investment movement on impact, but then grad-
Note: This figure displays the average impulse responses of firm investment to monetary policy
shocks (left panel) and credit supply shocks (right panel) following the specification in Equation
(2.3). The monetary policy shock is constructed following Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016);
Gurkaynak et al. (2005) and the data sample runs from 1990Q1 to 2007Q4 as in Ottonello and
Winberry (2020). The monetary policy shock is normalized and standardized. The solid line is the
impulse response and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. This figure shows that both
monetary policy shocks and credit supply shocks have strong implications for firm investment, yet
the former has a short-lived impact while the latter has a persistent impact.
Figure 2.6: Average Responses to Monetary Policy and Credit Supply Shocks
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ually rises to above 1.3% seven quarters after the shock. In terms of magnitude,
both credit supply shocks and monetary policy shocks have strong implications for
firm investment though they have different patterns. In line with the conventional
wisdom, monetary policy shocks have only short-lived effects on real variables, while
the effects of credit supply shocks are persistent over time. This again verifies that
the credit supply shock identified in the benchmark identification is a real shock,
while the monetary policy shock is nominal and only has impacts in the short-term.
It is hard to directly compare the results to other related literature that studies
the impacts of credit supply shocks on firm investment for two reasons. First, I use
a different data set from other literature. For example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018)
use data for European countries, Cingano et al. (2016) for Italy, and Amiti and
Weinstein (2018) for Japan. Second, most literature identifies the credit supply
shock using the event study approach or granular methods. They either focus on
the Great Recession period (Duchin et al. (2010)), which is removed in the regression
in this paper, or they identify the idiosyncratic credit supply shock while I focus on
the common credit supply shock that hits the whole banking sector.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous Firm Investment Responses
To study the heterogeneous firm investment responses to credit supply shocks
conditional on their individual characteristics, I estimate panel regressions projecting
the measure of firm investment on the intersection term of firm characteristics and
the credit supply shock, conditional on a set of firm and aggregate control variables.
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I estimate variants of the baseline empirical specification shown below
∆logkit = αi + αst + βxit−1 × εt + ΓZit−1 + eit (2.4)
where the LHS variable is the investment of firm i at the end of period t; xi,t−1 is
one of the firm characteristic measures in the previous period to ensure exogeneity,
and εt is the credit supply shock. xit is a firm’s distance-to-default (dd), size, age,
or volatility. As mentioned in the previous section, these measures are endogenously
interlinked to each other and the results conditional on each measure are similar and
consistent. Therefore, I will mainly focus on the distance-to-default and leave the
rest for robustness checks. The main coefficient of interest is β, which measures how
the semielasticity of firm investment in response to credit supply shocks depends
on the firm characteristics. To control for the factors that may simultaneously
affect firm investment and characteristics, I include firm-fixed effect αi, sector-by-
time fixed effect αst, and a vector of firm controls Zit−1. The firm control variables
are the same as in Equation (2.3). In addition, it also includes the level of firm
characteristics xit−1, and its intersection term with the previous period’s output
growth to control for differences in cyclical sensitivities across firms. The idea to
control for the cyclical sensitivity is to avoid the bias in the results caused by the
fact that firms with different characteristics may be differentially exposed to business
cycles. The firm characteristics xit−1 are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5% and
standardized over the entire sample, and thus the units become standard deviations
in the sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dd × credit shock 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.010
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.060)
dd (firm mean) × credit shock -0.005
(0.048)
dd (firm variation) × credit shock 0.009
(0.056)
size × credit shock 0.033
(0.039)
volatility × credit shock -0.022
(0.048)
age × credit shock -0.187
(0.124)
Observations 221035 221035 221035 221035 221035 316641 316001 316642
R2 0.099 0.104 0.104 0.129 0.104 0.086 0.081 0.082
Firm Controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes no ∆logkit−1 yes yes yes yes
Time Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2.4) (columns other than (5)) and
Equation (2.5) (column (5)). Firm characteristics are winsorized and standardized. In columns
other than (5), firm control variables include the level of firm characteristics in the previous period
xit−1, total assets, sales growth, current assets as a share of total assets, and a fiscal quarter dummy;
additional controls include the intersection of xit−1 with output growth to control for cyclical sen-





the cyclical sensitivity control is replaced by their intersections with output growth, respectively.
Column (4) adds ∆logkit−1 as an additional firm control besides the cyclical sensitivity control.
The standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown in paren-
theses. The table shows that the firm characteristics do not play a significant role in determining
firm investment to credit supply shocks in the entire sample period.
Table 2.4: Heterogeneous Responses of Firm Investment to Credit Supply Shocks
Table 2.4 reports the results from estimating the baseline specification (2.4).
The first four columns show that firm distance-to-default has no implications for
firm investment in response to credit supply shocks. Column (1) and column (2) es-
timate the empirical model with and without firm controls respectively. Column (3)
removes the control for cyclical sensitivity and column (4) adds lagged firm invest-
ment as an additional firm control variable. The results are robust to each variant
estimation. The coefficient on the intersection term is negligible in magnitude and
imprecisely estimated.
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Column (5) re-estimates the baseline specification by decomposing the firm
distance-to-default into a permanent component and a within-firm variation com-
ponent as suggested by Ottonello and Winberry (2020)




× εt + ΓZit−1 + eit (2.5)
where E[ddit] is the mean of an individual firm’s distance-to-default during the sam-




is the demeaned firm distance-to-default that captures the within-firm variation over
time. Accordingly, the firm control variables replace ddit−1 and its intersection with
lagged output growth with the corresponding decomposed terms. The insignificant
effects of firm default risk on firm investment to credit supply shocks do not change.
Columns (6) to (8) estimate the baseline model with firm age, volatility, and
size, and the results do not change either.
This finding is inconsistent with a series of related literature, which finds that
firm characteristics such as default risk, size, or age will affect firm activities dif-
ferentially in response to monetary policy shocks or over the business cycles, such
as Cloyne et al. (2018); Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020); Gertler and Gilchrist (1994);
Ottonello and Winberry (2020). Does this mean that these firm characteristics do
not play a role in firm investment responses to credit supply shocks? Not necessarily.
The underlying assumption in the baseline specification is that the firm character-
istics will influence firm investment in the same manner independent of the credit
cycle phases. To put it another way, Equation (2.4) assumes that β is the same
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for both positive and negative credit supply shocks. This is an assumption usually
imposed in the literature and it may not hold in all scenarios. As will be shown
in the next subsection, the assumption fails in the settings in this paper, and the
insignificance of the coefficients in Table 2.4 is caused by this misspecification.
2.5.2.1 State-dependence
To address the misspecification caused by not disentangling credit expansions
and contractions, I estimate the following specification
∆logkit = αi + αst + β
+ddit−1 × ε+t + β−ddit−1 × ε−t + ΓZit−1 + eit (2.6)
The only difference from Equation (2.4) is that I decompose the credit supply shock
εt into credit expansions ε
+
t and contractions ε
−
t . I construct positive credit supply
shocks ε+t = εt if εt > 0 and ε
+
t = 0 otherwise. Similarly, ε
−
t = εt if εt < 0 and ε
−
t = 0
otherwise. β+ measures the relevance of firm distance-to-default in characterizing
firm investment responses to a positive credit supply shock, and β− measures that
to a negative shock.
Table 2.5 reports the coefficients of interest β+ and β− from Equation (2.6).
Noticeably, the coefficients have flipped signs and commensurate magnitudes during
credit expansions and contractions, and they are significant and robust to variant
specifications. Recall that the firm characteristic measures are standardized, thus
ddit−1 is positive if it is larger than the sample mean and negative otherwise. In
column (1), the positive coefficient in the top row implies that a firm with one std
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
dd × pos credit shock 0.314∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.266∗∗
(0.141) (0.133) (0.130) (0.124)
dd × neg credit shock -0.299∗∗ -0.275∗∗ -0.272∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(0.118) (0.113) (0.113) (0.104)
Observations 221035 221035 221035 221035
R2 0.099 0.104 0.104 0.129
Firm Controls no yes yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes no ∆logkit−1
Time Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2.6). Positive credit supply shocks
are set to be the original credit shock if it is positive and zero otherwise, analogously to the negative
supply shocks. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are
shown in parentheses. This table shows that the heterogeneous response of firm investment to
credit supply shocks conditional on firm distance-to-default are state-dependent.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.5: State-dependent Responses Conditional on Firm Default Risk
higher distance-to-default than the sample mean will increase 0.314% more invest-
ment to one unit of a positive credit supply shock, while the negative coefficient
in the bottom row implies that the same firm will contract its investment 0.299%
less to one unit of a negative credit supply shock. Adding firm control variables
in column (2) does not change the results significantly. The result is also robust
to variant specifications by removing cyclical sensitivity control in column (3), or
by adding firm lagged investment in column (4). Overall, the results indicate that
a low default risk firm will consistently have higher investment relative to average
firms – its investment increases more in credit expansions and decline less during
credit contractions.
The results suggest that firm default risk does play a role in affecting firm
investment in response to credit supply shocks. However, the reason why we barely
find any significant results in Table 2.4 is that the heterogeneous effects are state-
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dependent. During credit expansions, firms with low default risk are able to expand
more aggressively and invest more; during credit contractions, they could smooth
their investment by cutting investment less. Table B.4 in Appendix B.2 reports the
results from estimating the specification (2.6) with alternative cyclical sensitivity
controls and along with firm leverage and liquidity ratios. The results are robust to
controlling for these factors.
In order to estimate the dynamic heterogeneous responses conditional on firm
default risk, I estimate a dynamic version of the specification (2.6) as follows
∆logkit+h = αih + αsth + β
+




h ddit−1 × ε
−
t + ΓhZit−1 + eith (2.7)
where h is the forecast horizon, and β+h measures the effects of a firm’s distance-
to-default ddit−1 on the cumulative response of firm investment ∆logkit+h in period
t+ h to a positive credit supply shock in period t, and β−h measures the effects to a
negative shock. Other settings are the same as in Equation (2.6).
Figure 2.7 presents the impulse responses from estimating Equation (2.7). For
comparison, the left column shows the impulse responses of firm investment without
decomposing credit supply shocks into expansions and contractions. During the
entire sample period, the coefficient on the intersection term is small in magnitude
and imprecisely estimated. In contrast, the middle column shows that one unit of a
credit expansion will induce a firm with one std higher distance-to-default to invest
0.29% more on impact, and the effect grows to around 1% three quarters after the
shock. The right column shows that in response to one unit of a credit contraction,
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Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of firm investment conditional on firm distance-
to-default to the credit supply shock in the entire sample (left panel), credit expansions (middle
panel), and credit contractions (right panel). The solid line is the impulse response and the shaded
area is the 90% confidence interval. This figure shows that the heterogeneous effects of the firm
default risk on firm investment are state-dependent.
Figure 2.7: State-dependent Responses Conditional on Firm Default Risk
a firm with one std higher distance-to-default will cut its investment 0.28% less
on impact, and the effect reaches around 1.5% five quarters after the shock. The
effects are persistent throughout the forecast horizons. Both Table 2.5 and Figure
2.7 convey a consistent message that the firm default risk has a significant and large
impact on firm investment to credit supply shocks, and the heterogeneous effects
depend on the credit cycle phases. Firms with lower default risk consistently have
higher investment relative to average firms through credit cycles.
2.5.2.2 Mechanism Inspection
To investigate the reasons for the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of
firm investment to credit supply shocks due to default risk, I provide evidence on
the responses of firm borrowing cost and external financing over credit cycles. The
borrowing cost is measured as average interest payment scaled by lagged total assets,
and the external financing is defined as the sum of cumulative changes of total debts
and equities scaled by lagged total assets.
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First, I re-estimate the specification (2.6), replacing the LHS variables with
either firm borrowing cost or external financing and keeping other settings invariant.
Table 2.6 reports the estimation results. In column (1), the top row shows that a
firm with one std higher distance-to-default will have a 0.013% lower average interest
payment as a share of total assets relative to average firms in response to one unit of
a positive credit supply shock, and the same firm will have a 0.015% lower borrowing
cost to a negative shock. The mean of average interest payment over the total asset
in the data sample is 0.6374%, and the back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the
low default risk firm will have a roughly 2% lower borrowing cost relative to average
firms in either credit expansions or contractions. Columns (2) to (4) estimate the
responses of the overall external financing, the external debt and equity respectively
to credit supply shocks. Column (2) implies that a firm with one std higher distance-
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest Payment External Financing External Debt External Equity
dd × pos credit shock -0.013∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.255∗
(0.008) (0.171) (0.058) (0.147)
dd × neg credit shock 0.015 -0.449∗∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.149) (0.053) (0.110)
Observations 193758 220399 220419 221014
R2 0.533 0.084 0.055 0.075
Firm Controls yes yes yes yes
Time Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2.6), replacing the LHS variables
with firm borrowing cost or external financing. The firm borrowing cost is measured by average
interest payment, and the firm external financing is defined as the sum of cumulative changes
of total debts and equities, both scaled by lagged total assets. The standard errors are two-way
clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown in parentheses. This table shows that low
default risk firms consistently have lower borrowing costs and better access to external financing
in both credit expansions and contractions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.6: Responses of Firm Borrowing Cost and External Financing
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to-default will in total borrow 0.459% more from outside relative to average firms,
scaled by total assets, to one unit of a positive credit supply shock and borrow
0.449% more to one unit of a negative shock. Specifically, similar results hold for
both external debt and equity financing. The results imply that firms with lower
default risk will always have better access to external resources including both debt
instruments and equities through credit cycles.
Second, I estimate the dynamic responses of firm borrowing cost and external
financing following specification (2.7), and the impulse responses are reported in
Figure 2.8. The forecast horizon is set to be 12 quarters since financial variables
respond to credit supply shocks more rapidly and it is also approximately the aver-
Note: This figure displays the state-dependent impulse responses of firm borrowing cost and overall
external financing to credit supply shocks conditional on firm default risk. The solid line is the
impulse response and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. This figure shows that low
default risk firms have consistently low borrowing cost and better access to external financing over
credit cycles.
Figure 2.8: Dynamic Responses of Firm Borrowing Cost and External Financing
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age maturity of debt in Compustat. The left column shows the impulse responses
in the entire sample period without distinguishing between credit expansions and
contractions; the middle column shows the results for positive credit supply shocks
and the right column for the negative shocks. The left column indicates that the
impulse responses of neither interest payments nor the overall external financing are
significantly affected by the firm default risk to credit supply shocks. However, in
the middle column, the top row shows that during a credit expansion, a low default
risk firm has a lower borrowing cost than average firms. This advantage also holds
during credit contractions as shown in the right column. The pattern is similar for
overall firm external financing in the bottom row. During a credit expansion, the
external financing as a share of total assets is about 1% larger for firms with one
std higher distance-to-default than average firms four quarters after the shock. The
differential effect is more than doubled, above 2% for low default risk firms during
credit contractions. I also provide evidence on the responses of external debt and
equity respectively in Figure B.3 in Appendix B.2.
Overall, the evidence implies that a firm with lower default risk will consis-
tently have lower borrowing costs and better access to external resources over credit
cycles, in both credit expansions and contractions. The effects are significant and
persistent, holding for over 3 years after the shock. It explains the state-dependence
of the differential responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks in the previ-
ous section. During a credit expansion, low default risk firms have lower borrowing
costs and can borrow from outside more easily to expand their investment relative
to average firms. During a credit contraction, their borrowing cost is still lower
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and they still have better options in financing from outside, which enables them
to smooth their investment during downturns and contract their investment less
compared to average firms.
2.5.2.3 Implications
The state-dependence of heterogeneous responses of firm activity to structural
shocks conditional on firm characteristics is a fact that has been overlooked in the
literature and has important implications on both empirical and theoretical sides
for future research.
On the empirical side, there is a possibility of misspecification when investigat-
ing the role of firm characteristics in determining firm activities to exogenous shocks
if one does not carefully distinguish between different phases of exogenous shocks.
As shown in Table 2.4, the coefficients on the intersection term of firm characteris-
tics with credit supply shocks are negligible in magnitude and imprecisely estimated
without separating credit expansions and contractions. The insignificance of the
heterogeneity comes from the improperly imposed assumption that the effects of
firm characteristics on firm activity are invariant to credit cycle phases. The ab-
sence of any findings when estimating during the entire sample period is not the
absence of the heterogeneity caused by firm characteristics in response to credit
supply shocks. Instead, it conceals the fact that the heterogeneous responses have
flipped signs and commensurate magnitudes during credit expansions and contrac-
tions. To rephrase this from another perspective, even if one finds significant effects
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of firm characteristics on firm activities, it would be best to assure this effect holds
in both phases of exogenous shocks. For example, Jeenas (2018) documents that
firms with lower liquid asset holdings will be more responsive to monetary policy
shocks in a specification including both monetary expansions and contractions, and
then he focuses on the monetary tightening scenario, arguing that lower liquid asset
ratios are associated with less investment after a contractionary monetary policy
shock. The evidence from my paper suggests that it is valid to re-check the estima-
tion by distinguishing between expansionary and contractionary monetary shocks
and ensure it is the case. Also, Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020) argue that small firms
are more cyclically sensitive than large firms by estimating the semi-elasticity of
firm-level growth to GDP growth conditional on firm size, and then they emphasize
that small firms would contract more during downturns, though they do not inten-
tionally distinguish between positive and negative GDP growth in their estimation.
Again, it is valid to ask whether the larger sensitivity of small firms holds both in
surges and downturns over the business cycles.
On the theoretical side, the evidence from this paper is consistent with the
financial friction literature yet it proposes new questions. This paper suggests that
a firm with higher default risk will incur a higher borrowing cost and be less able to
borrow from outside during a credit contraction, and thus be more negatively im-
pacted and cut investment by more. This is consistent with the financial accelerator
theory in Bernanke et al. (1999) that a financially constrained firm will contract
more during economic downturns. There is a long literature studying the role of
financial frictions in amplifying negative shocks during recessions such as Jensen
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et al. (2020); Mendoza (2010). Khan and Thomas (2013); Khan et al. (2016) intro-
duce firm heterogeneity in a financial friction model and find that a negative shock
to borrowing conditions can generate a large and persistent recession via capital
misallocation. On the other hand, there is another strand of literature emphasiz-
ing that financial friction might also dampen the effects of exogenous shocks. For
example, Ottonello and Winberry (2020) build a heterogeneous firm New Keyne-
sian model and show that the investment of financially constrained firms is less
responsive to monetary expansionary shocks. The state-dependent heterogeneous
responses of firm activity in my paper proposes two questions that are challenging
for existing models to explain. First, for models featuring default risk as in Khan
et al. (2016); Ottonello and Winberry (2020), they are successful in matching firm
dynamics in the data during either a contractionary or expansionary period in re-
sponse to an exogenous shock. Yet their results will be mirrored if they flip the sign
of exogenous shocks. To put it another way, these works argue that financial fric-
tions will consistently either amplify or dampen the exogenous shocks independent
of whether it is expansionary or contractionary. However, my paper suggests that
financial frictions do not systematically amplify or dampen the credit shocks. The
direction of the effects of financial frictions on firm activity depends on the phases
of the credit cycles. It amplifies the effects of negative credit supply shocks but
dampens that of the positive shocks. These models would not be able to generate
state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm activity to credit supply shocks.
Second, for models featuring occasionally binding constants such as Jensen et al.
(2020); Khan and Thomas (2013); Mendoza (2010), they could generate the asym-
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metric effects of financial frictions over business cycles in the settings where the
financial frictions become not binding during expansions. However, the evidence in
my paper implies that financial frictions are always binding in both expansions and
contractions. This paper shows that low default risk firms consistently have lower
borrowing costs and more external resources in both expansions and contractions,
and therefore, they could invest more when credit conditions ease and contract less
when credit conditions tighten, which is not consistent with the occasionally binding
constraint mechanism. Though both strands of literature characterize the financial
frictions in their models, there is not an active role played by the financial inter-
mediaries. The evidence in this paper suggests that banks consistently favor low
default risk firms while making lending decisions during both credit expansions and
contractions. A model aiming to match the state-dependent heterogeneous effects
of financial frictions shall take this fact into account.
2.5.3 Additional Empirical Results
In this section, I provide additional evidence reinforcing the findings of state-
dependent heterogeneous responses of firm activity to credit supply shocks. First, I
will show that firms that are larger, older, and less volatile also consistently have ad-
vantages over average firms through credit cycles. They have lower borrowing costs
and better access to external resources in both credit expansions and contractions,
and therefore, they can expand their investment more during credit expansions and
cut their investment less during credit contractions. Second, I show that the re-
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sults are robust to alternative credit shock identifications. I use alternative data for
both credit volume and credit price and alternative VAR sign restrictions choices
inspired by Mian et al. (2017). The state-dependence of heterogeneous effects is
largely invariant to these variations.
2.5.3.1 Firm Size, Age and Volatility
There has been a long tradition in the literature using firm size as a proxy
for firm financial frictions and studying its impacts on firm activity to exogenous
shocks since Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). In a recent work, Cloyne et al. (2018)
argue that young firms are more responsive to monetary shocks in the US and the
UK. There is also a growing strand of literature arguing that firm-level volatility
is an important determinant of firm responses to exogenous shocks, for example,
Vavra (2013). Motivated by these works, I explore the empirical link between firm
size, age, and volatility and their investment response to credit supply shocks.
Figure 2.9 presents the impulse responses of firm investment to credit supply
shocks conditional on firm size, age, and volatility following the specification (2.7).
The firm control variables do not include firm total assets when estimating the spec-
ification for firm size due to collinearity concerns, since firm sales and total assets
are highly correlated as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.1. The top row shows
the impulse responses of firm investment conditional on firm size, the middle row
on firm age, and the bottom row on firm volatility. The left panel displays the im-
pulse responses without distinguishing between credit expansions and contractions.
101
Again, the heterogeneous effects of firm characteristics on firm investment to credit
supply shocks are barely significant during the entire sample period. However, the
middle column implies that during a credit expansion, larger, older, and less volatile
firms will expand their investment more relative to average firms. In the right col-
umn, these firms will cut their investment less during credit contractions. Firms
that are one std larger measured by average real sales will increase their investment
Note: This figure displays the state-dependent impulse responses of firm investment to credit
supply shocks conditional on firm size, age, and volatility. The solid line is the impulse response
and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. This figure shows that the investment of larger,
older, and less volatile firms will increase more during credit expansions and decline less during
credit contractions.
Figure 2.9: State-dependent Responses Conditional on Other Characteristics
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1% more than average firms one year after a positive credit shock, and contract their
investment 1% less after a negative shock. The investment of a mature firm, existing
for 10 years or older, will increase 2% more than young firms six quarters after a
credit expansion, and decline 3% less five afters after a credit contraction. A firm
that has one std smaller volatility measured by the standard deviation of real sales
growth will increase its investment 1% more than average firms four quarters after a
positive credit supply shock, and contract its investment 1.5% less five quarters after
a negative shock. The state-dependent heterogeneous effects are large, significant,
and persistent throughout the forecast horizons.
Figure B.4 and Figure B.5 in Appendix B.2 present the evidence on dynamic
responses of firm borrowing cost and external financing to credit supply shocks. The
mechanism investigation reveals consistent findings to the state-dependent heteroge-
neous responses of firm investment conditional on firm characteristics. Larger, older,
and less volatile firms consistently have lower borrowing costs and better access to
external resources in both credit expansions and contractions.
To summarize, the results of the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of
firm investment to credit supply shocks also hold for firm size, age, and volatility.
The investment of firms that are larger, older, and less volatile will increase more
during credit expansions and decline less during credit contractions, since they ben-
efit from lower borrowing costs and more external financing options consistently
through credit cycles.
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2.5.3.2 Alternative Shock Identifications
We have established the main results of state-dependent heterogeneous re-
sponses of firm investment to credit supply shocks extracted from the benchmark
identification. In this section, I will show that the results are invariant to credit sup-
ply shocks extracted from alternative identifications using either alternative credit
data or alternative sign restriction choices.
First, I identify the credit supply shock employing alternative credit volume
and price data. In the first variation, I use only corporate bonds in the nonfinancial
corporate business sector as the credit volume measure; in the second variation, I use
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a) credit spread as the credit price measure. Second,
I employ an alternative identification strategy by introducing a price level index in
the benchmark identification. As argued by Mian et al. (2017), in an open economy,
a credit supply shock would shift out the aggregate supply, and therefore, it has
a deflationary effect on the nontradable goods sector. For the price level index, I
use the services CPI (less energy services) as a proxy for nontradable sector price
index following Mian et al. (2017) and additionally, I use the producer price index
for robustness check. I add the price level variable into the benchmark VAR model,
and impose a negative sign on the price level for a credit expansion, while keeping
the sign restrictions on other variables invariant. In sum, I extract four more credit
supply shock series based on the benchmark identification by using an alternative
credit volume measure, an alternative credit price measure, and using an alternative
identification strategy by adding a price level index from two candidates.
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Table 2.7 reports the correlations between the credit supply shock from the
benchmark identification and the shock series from the alternative identifications.
The correlation is 0.834 between the benchmark credit supply shock and the alter-
native identification replacing the credit volume with only corporate bonds, 0.904 if
I replace the credit price with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a) spread, 0.798 if I add
price index in the alternative identification strategy using services CPI (less energy
services), and 0.84 if using producer price index instead. It shows that the credit
supply shock extracted from the benchmark identification and the alternatives are
highly correlated in the past 45 years, implying that the identification structural
model is stable to the variant identifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate Bond GZ Spread Services CPI PPI
Correlation 0.834 0.904 0.798 0.840
Note: This table reports the correlation of the credit supply shocks identified from the benchmark
identification and the alternative specifications. Column (1) replaces the credit volume with only
nonfinancial corporate bonds. Column (2) replaces the credit price with the Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012a) spread. Column (3) adds price level in the benchmark identification using services CPI
(less energy services), Column (4) using the producer price index. This table shows that the credit
supply shocks from the benchmark and alternative identifications are highly positively correlated.
Table 2.7: Correlation of Credit Supply Shocks Between Identifications
Figure 2.10 shows the average impulse responses of firm investment to the
credit supply shocks extracted from various identifications by estimating Equation
(2.3). The impulse responses are similar across identification specifications. The
credit supply shock has significant and persistent effects on the firm investment.
The effects grow gradually in the first ten quarters after the shock, and then decays







Note: This figure displays the average impulse responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks
from both the benchmark identification and alternative specifications. The solid lines are impulse
responses and the dashed lines are the 90% confidence intervals. The identified credit supply shock
has large and persistent impacts on firm investment despite the identification specifications.
Figure 2.10: Responses of Firm Investment to Alternative Credit Supply Shocks
Figure 2.11 shows the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm invest-
ment conditional on distance-to-default to credit supply shocks from alternative
identifications by estimating Equation (2.7). In the left column, the impulse re-
sponses of firm investment to credit supply shocks conditional on firm default risk
are insignificant in any identifications over the entire sample period. The middle






Note: This figure displays the state-dependent impulse responses of firm investment to credit
supply shocks from both benchmark identification and alternative specifications conditional on
firm default risk. The solid lines are impulse responses and the dashed lines are 90% confidence
intervals. This figure shows that the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm investment
to credit supply shocks conditional on default risk are robust to alternative identifications.
Figure 2.11: State-dependent Responses to Alternative Credit Supply Shocks
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vest more relative to average firms for each identification throughout the forecast
horizons. The confidence interval band becomes narrower if I use alternative credit
volume or credit price data, but becomes wider and loses its significance if I use
alternative identification strategies by introducing a price level index. The right
column shows that in each alternative identification, low default risk firms will cut
their investment less during credit contractions. The only identification that loses
significance is the one when I introduce services CPI in the identification.
Overall, identifying the credit supply shocks using either alternative data or
alternative identification strategies does not change the main results significantly.
Low default risk firms have consistent advantages over average firms through credit
cycles. Their investment increases more during credit expansions and declines less
during credit contractions. However, the heterogeneous effects of firm default risk
on firm investment to credit supply shocks will disappear if we estimate without
disentangling credit expansions and contractions.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I identify a series of credit supply shocks in the US since the
1970s and apply the identified shock to firm-level data. I document two main find-
ings. First, the identified credit supply shock has a significant and persistent impact
on firm investment. Different from monetary policy shocks, the credit supply shock
has medium- and long-term effects on real variables. Second, the heterogeneous
responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks conditional on firm character-
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istics are state-dependent. Firms with lower default risk, larger size, older age, and
smaller volatility will consistently have lower borrowing costs and better access to
external financing over credit cycles, and therefore, always have a higher investment
relative to average firms. Their investment increases more during credit expansions
and declines less during credit contractions. This finding has both empirical and
theoretical implications for future research. Empirically, it highlights the possibility
of misspecification when investigating the effects of firm characteristics on firm ac-
tivity to exogenous shocks without disentangling expansionary and contractionary
phases. Theoretically, it implies that financial frictions do not systematically am-
plify or dampen the effects of credit supply shocks. It amplifies the effects of the
negative shocks as the financial friction literature emphasizes; however, it dampens
the effects of the positive shocks. The state-dependence of heterogeneous effects
could not be explained by the existing models that are linear to expansionary and
contractionary shocks. A future model featuring credit cycles and heterogeneous
financial frictions should take this observation into account.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Data Construction
1. Consumption: nominal consumption from IMF IFS private sector final con-
sumption expenditure (except China), deflated by CPI from IMF IFS. China
consumption is from Oxford Economics via Datastream.
2. GDP: nominal GDP from IMF IFS, and converted to US dollars by spot
exchange rate when necessary
3. CPI: consumer price index from IMF IFS (except Argentina). Argentina CPI
is from Oxford Economics via Datastream.
4. Exchange rate: nominal national currency per US dollar from IMF IFS, con-
verted to real exchange rate by CPI
5. Bilateral balance of payment vis-à-vis the US: BEA International Transactions
Table 1.3
6. The US balance of payment: BEA International Transactions Table 1.1
7. The US net foreign asset: BEA International Investment Position Table 1.2
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8. Risky asset share: total equity asset holdings (FDI, portfolio equity, and other
equity) scaled by total asset net of derivatives from IMF IFS
9. Financial sector value: the market value of public financial firms listed in do-
mestic market existing before 2007 via Datastream, scaled by GDP, including
banks, life and non-life insurance, real estate investment & services, real es-
tate investment trusts, financial services, and equity investment instruments
following Industry Classification Benchmark jointly created by FTSE and Dow
Jones



















Note: This figure displays the global real consumption growth and exchange rate dynamics at
the country level during the GFC. The real consumption growth rates and exchange rates are
normalized to zero in 2007Q4. Real consumption growth is year-on-year log-difference. Only
Brazil, China, and Germany had a smaller real consumption growth decline than the US during
the GFC. The real exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar are in log-levels. Only Argentina, China,
and Japan have appreciated currencies during GFC.

















Note: This figure displays the external portfolio and financial sector market value at the country
level during the GFC. The risky asset share is calculated as the equity asset holdings (FDI, portfolio,
and other equity investments) over the total asset net of derivatives. The financial sector market
value is scaled by output, and normalized to zero in 2007M10. The financial sector includes banks,
life and non-life insurance, real estate investment & services, real estate investment trusts, financial
services, and equity investment instruments. I only include the financial firms that already exist
before 2007. The US suffered the largest risky asset share drop, and bore more capital losses in
the financial sector than two-thirds of the countries in the sample during the GFC.
Figure A.2: Risky Asset Share and Financial Sector Net Worth at Country Level
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Note: The figure displays the key variables’ impulse responses to a 10% Home endowment decline.
Blue solid lines are the Home country variables and the orange dashed lines are the Foreign country
variables. The figure highlights the deleveraging process in the Home country in response to a Home
endowment shock. As a result, the fire sales by the Home country will smooth its consumption,
and increase its currency value.
Figure A.3: Impulse Responses to a Home Endowment Shock
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Note: The figure displays the key variables’ impulse responses to a 10% Foreign endowment decline.
Blue solid lines are the Home country variables and the orange dashed lines are the Foreign country
variables. Unlike the impulse responses to a global or Home endowment shock, Foreign banks will
suffer heavier capital losses and fire sell their risky asset holdings in response to a negative Foreign
endowment shock. The relative consumption in the Foreign country increases and the Home
currency depreciates.
Figure A.4: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Endowment Shock
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Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of real consumption growth in the Home and
Foreign country to exogenous endowment shocks in the model. Blue solid lines are the Home
country variables and the orange dashed lines are the Foreign country variables. The Foreign
country consumption growth declines more than the Home country in response to each endowment
shock. This figure shows that the two measures of consumption dynamics, consumption share and
consumption growth, predict consistent implications to a Home and global endowment shock, and
inconsistent predictions to a Foreign endowment shock since consumption quantity and exchange
rate dynamics move in opposite directions in this scenario. However, we mainly focus on the first
two scenarios and the main results do not change employing either measure.
Figure A.5: Impulse Responses of Consumption Growth
114
Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of VIX, the gross capital inflows from the US
in foreign countries, the US and foreign countries’ real consumption, and the real exchange rates
to a positive one standard deviation in VIX in an alternative VAR specification. I order the US
and foreign countries’ consumption first, and then the VIX, the gross inflows from the US in
foreign countries, and the real exchange rate. The ordering follows the idea that “slow-moving”
variables first and then “fast-moving” variables. I count the real variables (real consumption) as
“slow-moving” variables and the financial variables (VIX, capital inflow and real exchange rate)
as “fast-moving”. As documented in the literature (Chari et al. (2002)), the real exchange rate is
very volatile and I count it as a “fast-moving” variable. The figure implies a capital retrenchment
in the US during a crisis, a deeper consumption decline and a currency depreciation in foreign
countries, consistent with Figure 1.7 in the main text.
Figure A.6: Impulse Responses to VIX in an Alternative VAR Specification
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A.3 Proof of Portfolio Share χ = 1− α
In this section, I will show that the foreign asset portfolio share χ = 1− α in
steady state, where α is the domestic consumption bias.
From the Home country households’ budget constraint, we have
C +D =Π +RD
C =(1− σ)[(Rk −R)φ+ (R∗k −Rk)χφ+R]N − ξU + (R− 1)D
=[(Rk −R)φ+R]N − σ[(Rk −R)φ+R]N − ξU + (R− 1)D
=[(Rk −R)φ+R]N −N + (R− 1)D
=[(Rk −R)φ+R− 1]N + (R− 1)D
=(Rk −R)U + (R− 1)N + (R− 1)D
=(Rk −R)U + (R− 1)U
=(Rk − 1)U
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ToT 2α−1τα−1C∗ − C
=
(1− α)ToT 2α−1τα−1C∗ − (1− α)C
ToT 2α−1τα−1C∗ − C
=1− α
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A.4 Proof of Equation (1.10)
In this section, I provide the proof for Equation (1.10). The Home and Foreign
country budget constraints denoted in Home currency are




EtC∗t + EtU∗t = EtR∗kt(1− χ∗t−1)U∗t−1 +RktEt−1χ∗t−1U∗t−1
Subtract the two country budget constraints, we have
Ct − EtC∗t

























The Home country net foreign asset position is defined as the difference be-
tween foreign asset and foreign liability in the Home country:
NFAt =χtUt − Etχ∗tU∗t
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From Gourinchas and Rey (2007b),
NFAt = RtNFAt−1 + NXt
= NFAt−1 + VAt + NXt
where Rt is the gross returns on NFA from t− 1 to t, and VAt is the valuation gain
on NFA. Also,
RtNFAt−1 = RAt FAt−1 −RLt FLt−1
where RAt and R
L








FAt−1 = χt−1Ut−1, FLt−1 = Et−1χ∗t−1U∗t−1
the relative consumption equation can be simplified into












=− NXt + C̃t − EtC̃∗t
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Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Data Construction
B.1.1 Aggregate Data
1. GDP: nominal GDP from BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5, deflated by gross domestic
product implicit price deflator (FRED: GDPDEF)
2. Consumption: the sum of personal consumption expenditures on nondurable
goods and services from BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5, deflated by nondurable goods
implicit price deflator (FRED: DNDGRD3Q086SBEA) and services implicit
price deflator (FRED: DSERRD3Q086SBEA), respectively
3. Investment: gross private domestic investment from BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5,
deflated by gross private domestic investment implicit price deflator (FRED:
A006RD3Q086SBEA)
4. Unemployment rate: end of quarter unemployment rate from BLS (FRED:
UNRATE)
5. Productivity: utilization-adjusted TFP from Fernald (2014), converted to log-
levels
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6. Housing price: end of quarter real housing price from Shiller (2015)
7. Nonfinancial corporate business credit: nonfinancial corporate business debt
securities (FL104122005) plus loans (FL104123005) minus mortgages (FL103165005)
from US Financial Accounts Table L.103, deflated by CPI (FRED: CPI-
AUCSL)
8. Excess bond premium: originally constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a)
and updated by Favara et al. (2016)
9. CPI: end of quarter consumer price index for all urban consumers (FRED:
CPIAUCSL)
10. Nontradable sector price index: end of quarter consumer price index for all
urban consumers: services less energy services in US city average (FRED:
CUUR0000SASLE)
11. PPI: end of quarter producer price index of all commodities (FRED: PPIACO)
12. Nonfarm business sector implicit price deflator: quarterly (FRED: IPDNBS)
13. Federal funds rate: end of quarter effective federal funds rate (FRED: FED-
FUNDS)
14. 1-Year treasury constant maturity rate: daily (FRED: DGS1)
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B.1.2 Firm-level Data
This subsection describes the construction of firm-level variables used in the
empirical analysis of the paper, based on quarterly Compustat data. The definition
of the variables and sample selection process follow standard practices in the litera-
ture (see, for example, Clementi and Palazzo (2019); Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006);
Gomes (2001); Jeenas (2018); Ottonello and Winberry (2020)).
 Variables:
1. Real total assets: total assets (ATQ) deflated by nonfarm business sector
implicit price deflator
2. Real sales growth: quarter-on-quarter log differences in sales (SALEQ)
deflated by nonfarm business sector implicit price deflator
3. Distance-to-default (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a); Ottonello and Win-
berry (2020)):
dd =
ln(V/D) + (µV − 0.5σ2V )
σV
where V is the total value of the firm, µV the annual expected return on
V , σV the annual volatility of the firm’s value, and D the firm’s total debt.
The face value of debt D is defined as the sum of the firm’s short-term
debt and one half of long-term debt following Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012a). To estimate the firm’s value V , I follow an iterative procedure:
122
(a) Set an initial value for the firm value equal to the sum of firm debt
and equity, V = E + D, where E is measured as the firm’s stock
price times the number of shares from CRSP and D is the sum of
the firm’s short-term debt and one half of long-term debt following
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a).
(b) Estimate the mean and variance of return on firm value over a 250-
day moving window. The return on firm value is measured as the
daily log differences of firm value ∆logV .
(c) Obtain a new estimate of V for every day of the 250-day moving
window from the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing equation E =





, and δ2 = δ1 −
σV
√
T . The forecast horizon is assumed to be one year (T=1) and
thus r is the daily one-year constant maturity treasury-yield.
(d) Iterate on steps (b) and (c) until the firm value converges.






5. Age (Haltiwanger et al. (2013)): young firms (< 10y), or mature firms ( ≥
10y). Firm incorporation year is extracted from Datastream (WC18273
– Date of Incorporation).


















9. Sectoral dummies: (i) agriculture, forestry, and fishing: SIC < 999; (ii)
mining: SIC ∈ [1000; 1499]; (iii) construction: SIC ∈ [1500; 1799]; (iv)
manufacturing: SIC ∈ [2000; 3999]; (v) transportation, communications,
electric, gas, and sanitary services: SIC ∈ [4000; 4999]; (vi) wholesale
trade: SIC ∈ [5000; 5199]; (vii) retail trade SIC ∈ [5200; 5999]; (viii)
services: SIC ∈ [7000; 8999]
 Sample Selection: the empirical analysis excludes the following observations
1. Firms in finance, insurance, and real estate sectors (SIC ∈ [6000-6799]),
utilities (SIC ∈ [4900-4999]), and nonclassifiable establishment (SIC ∈
[9900-9999])
2. Firms not incorporated in the USA
3. Firm-quarter observations that satisfy one of the following conditions,
aimed at excluding outlier observations (also the subsequent quarter ob-
servations):
– Negative capital, assets, or sales
– Acquisitions larger than 5% of total assets
– Investment rate in the top and bottom 0.5% of the distribution
– Net current assets as a share of total assets higher than 10 or below -10
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– Leverage higher than 10 or negative
– Quarterly real sales growth above 2 or below -2
– Liquid assets as a share of total assets above 2 or below 0
– Firm capital observations less than 40 quarters
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Dist. to Default Age Volatility Size Total Assets ∆ log kit
Dist. to Default 1.000
Age 0.231 1.000
(0.000)
Volatility -0.202 -0.208 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.145 0.256 -0.103 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Assets 0.149 0.236 -0.092 0.820 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ log kit 0.125 -0.046 -0.014 -0.007 0.002 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.357)
Note: This table reports correlation matrix of firm-level variables across-sections before winsoriza-
tion and standardization. p-values are in parentheses.




Note: This figure displays the quarter-on-quarter changes of the excess bond premium and the
federal funds rate. The changes are standardized, and the units become standard deviations. The
shaded areas are the NBER recessions.
Figure B.1: Excess Bond Premium and Federal Funds Rate
MP(t-4) MP(t-3) MP(t-2) MP(t-1) MP(t) MP(t+1) MP(t+2) MP(t+3) MP(t+4)
EBP(t) 0.2944 0.2703 0.234 0.1803 0.1289 0.0481 -0.0148 -0.0468 -0.0864
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0166) (0.0882) (0.5261) (0.8451) (0.5371) (0.254)
Note: This table reports the moving correlation between excess bond premium and the federal
funds rate from 1973Q1 to 2018Q4. The correlation between leading federal funds rate and the
excess bond premium is positive, and the correlation between lagged federal fund rate and excess
bond premium becomes negative. The overall trend of moving correlation is declining as the federal
funds rate moves from leading to lagging.
Table B.2: Correlation Between Excess Bond Premium and Federal Funds Rate
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Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of benchmark variables in the VAR. A credit
expansion is assume to induce an increase on both credit volume and output, a decline on credit
price. The sign restriction on the federal funds rate is left open. The solid line is the median
impulse response and the shaded area is the 68% confidence interval. This figure shows that the
monetary policy rate will endogenously rise to a credit expansion though not significantly.
Figure B.2: Impulse Responses to Credit Supply Shocks (Agnostic on Federal
Funds Rate)
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B.2.2 Extra Empirical Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
credit shock 0.236∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.091) (0.082) (0.076) (0.079) (0.082) (0.126) (0.094)
dd × credit shock -0.009 -0.025
(0.064) (0.056)
size × credit shock 0.051 0.078∗
(0.042) (0.044)
volatility × credit shock -0.044 0.010
(0.051) (0.054)
age × credit shock -0.052 -0.032
(0.099) (0.073)
Observations 251641 251641 177123 251641 251641 251641 177123
R2 0.063 0.074 0.104 0.081 0.075 0.075 0.111
Firm Controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the average responses of firm investment to the identified credit supply
shock considering firm individual characteristics. Firm distance-to-default, size, and volatility is
winsorized and standardized. Firm age is a dummy variable. The standard errors are two-way
clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown in parentheses. This table shows that the
identified credit supply shock has a significant impact on firm investment.
Table B.3: Average Responses of Firm Investment to Credit Supply Shocks
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dd × pos credit shock 0.301∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.264∗ 0.301∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.308∗
(0.131) (0.132) (0.151) (0.159) (0.132) (0.158)
dd × neg credit shock -0.272∗∗ -0.281∗∗ -0.203∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.316∗∗
(0.113) (0.111) (0.121) (0.133) (0.111) (0.133)
leverage × pos credit shock 0.063 0.047
(0.118) (0.119)
leverage × neg credit shock -0.156 -0.176
(0.129) (0.130)
liquidity × pos credit shock -0.099 -0.089
(0.115) (0.114)
liquidity × neg credit shock -0.042 -0.073
(0.107) (0.104)
Observations 221035 221035 191338 221035 221035 221035
R2 0.104 0.104 0.112 0.105 0.105 0.106
Firm Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional Controls CPI Unrate VIX GDP GDP GDP
Time Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm investment to credit
supply shocks conditional on firm default risk controlling for alternative cyclical sensitivity and
financial positions. Column (1) uses the intersection term between firm distance-to-default and CPI
for cyclical sensitivity control, Column (2) replacing CPI with unemployment rate, and Column (3)
replacing CPI with VIX. Columns (4) to (6) introduce firm financial positions as additional control
variables. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown
in parentheses. This table shows that the state-dependent heterogeneous responses conditional on
firm default risk are invariant to theses variations.
Table B.4: State-dependent Responses to Credit Supply Shocks
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Note: This figure displays the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm external debt and
equity to credit supply shocks conditional on firm distance-to-default. The solid line is the median
impulse response and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. The left column displays the
responses without disentangling credit expansions and contractions for comparison. This figure
shows that low default risk firm have consistently better external resources in both debt instruments
and equities in both credit expansions and contractions.
Figure B.3: State-dependent Responses of Firm External Debt and Equity
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Note: This figure displays the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm borrowing cost to
credit supply shocks conditional on firm characteristics. The borrowing cost is measured as average
interest payment scaled by lagged total assets. The solid line is the median impulse response and
the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. The left column displays the responses without
disentangling credit expansions and contractions for comparison. This figure shows that larger,
older, and less volatile firms have consistently lower borrowing costs in both credit expansions and
contractions.
Figure B.4: State-dependent Responses of Firm Borrowing Cost
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Note: This figure displays the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm external financing
to credit supply shocks conditional on firm characteristics. The external financing is defined as
the sum of cumulative changes of total debts and equities scaled by lagged total assets. The solid
line is the median impulse response and the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. The
left column displays the responses without disentangling credit expansions and contractions for
comparison. This figure shows that larger, older, and less volatile firms have consistently better
access to external financing in both credit expansions and contractions.
Figure B.5: State-dependent Responses of Firm External Financing
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B.2.3 The Role of Firm Leverage and Liquidity
In this subsection, I study the role of firm financial positions (leverage and
liquidity) in determining firm investment responses to credit supply shocks. First,
I will show that firms with higher leverage and lower liquidity ratios will be less
responsive to credit supply shocks, and the heterogeneous effects mainly come from
the within-firm variation component. Second, I will show that the heterogeneous
effects due to firm leverage and liquidity do not show state-dependence to credit
supply shocks.
I decompose firm financial positions into a permanent component and a within-
firm variation component, similar to Equation (2.5) in the main text. The specifi-
cation is shown below





×εt + ΓZit−1 + eit
where xit−1 is winsorized and standardized firm leverage or liquidity ratios. E[xit]
is the mean of an individual firm’s financial position during the sample period, and
xit−1 is the demeaned firm financial position over time. Other settings are the same
as in Equation (2.5).
Table B.5 presents the estimation results. First, the first and third row shows
that the permanent differences of firm leverage and liquidity across firms barely affect
firm investment in response to credit supply shocks. In contrast, the heterogeneous
responses of firm investment mainly come from the within-firm variations as shown
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in the second and fourth row. Second, firms with higher leverage ratios or less
liquid asset holdings than usual will be less responsive to credit supply shocks. In
response to one unit of credit supply shocks, the investment of firms with one std
higher leverage ratio than they typically are will be 0.088% less responsive; the effect
would be 0.069% for firms with one std less liquid asset holdings than usual.
(1) (2) (3)
leverage (firm mean) × credit shock -0.024 -0.039
(0.036) (0.026)
leverage (firm variation) × credit shock -0.088∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023)
liquidity (firm mean) × credit shock -0.031 -0.045
(0.059) (0.055)
liquidity (firm variation) × credit shock 0.069∗ 0.050
(0.040) (0.038)
Observations 316642 316642 316642
R2 0.085 0.084 0.087
Firm Controls yes yes yes
Time Sector FE yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the heterogeneous responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks by
decomposing the firm financial positions into a permanent component and a within-firm variation
component. The explanatory variables are winsorized and standardized. The standard errors are
two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown in parentheses. This table shows
that firms with a higher leverage ratio or less liquid asset holdings than they typically are will be
less responsive to credit supply shocks, and the heterogeneity mainly comes from the within-firm
variation component.
Table B.5: Decomposed Heterogeneous Responses to Credit Supply Shocks
The phenomenon is more obvious in the dynamic responses estimated in the
specification below
∆logkit+h = αih + αsth + βhE[xit]× εt + γhxit−1 × εt + ΓhZit−1 + eith
where h denotes the forecast horizons and other specification details are invariant
to the static estimation.
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The impulse responses are shown in Figure B.6. The left column shows the
impulse responses without financial position decomposition for comparison. The first
column shows that firms with higher leverage or lower liquidity ratios will be less
responsive to credit shocks. The differences rise slowly over time and reach the peak
three years after the shock. However, the effects are imprecisely estimated with wide
confidence intervals. The middle column shows that the permanent component of
firm leverage or liquidity ratios barely contributes to the differential firm investment
responses. The magnitude is small and insignificant. However, if we move to the
right column, we can see that the within-firm variation component, for both leverage
and liquidity ratios, has a large and significant impact on differential firm investment
Note: This figure displays the impulse responses of firm investment to credit supply shocks con-
ditional on firm financial positions. The financial position is decomposed into a permanent com-
ponent and a within-firm variation component. The solid line is the median impulse response and
the shaded area is the 90% confidence interval. This figure shows that firms with a higher leverage
ratio or less liquid asset holdings than they typically are will be less responsive to credit supply
shocks, and the heterogeneity mainly comes from the within-firm variation component.
Figure B.6: Decomposed Dynamic Responses to Credit Supply Shocks
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responses. Firms with a higher leverage ratio or less liquid asset holdings than usual
will be less responsive to credit supply shocks. The heterogeneous responses of firm
investment mainly come from the within-firm variation instead of the permanent
firm characteristics. In the medium run, both leverage and liquidity have persistent
effects on heterogeneous firm investment responses.
I re-estimate Equation (2.6), replacing the firm distance-to-default with finan-
cial positions. The results are shown in Table B.6. The heterogeneous responses
of firm investment conditional on firm financial frictions to credit supply shocks do
not show significant state-dependence on impact.
(1) (2) (3)
leverage × pos credit shock -0.040 -0.065
(0.071) (0.057)
leverage × neg credit shock -0.114 -0.090
(0.077) (0.062)
liquidity × pos credit shock -0.075 -0.096
(0.114) (0.108)
liquidity × neg credit shock 0.106 0.078
(0.116) (0.108)
Observations 316642 316642 316642
R2 0.085 0.084 0.087
Firm Controls yes yes yes
Time Sector FE yes yes yes
Two-way Clustering yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the state-dependent heterogeneous responses of firm investment condi-
tional on firm financial positions to credit supply shocks. The credit supply shocks are decomposed
into positive and negative shocks. Positive credit supply shocks are set to be the original credit
shock if it is positive and zero otherwise, analogously to the negative supply shocks. The standard
errors are two-way clustered at the firm and quarter levels and are shown in parentheses. This
table shows that firm financial positions do not exhibit significant state-dependent heterogeneous
effects on firm investment to credit supply shocks.
Table B.6: State-dependent Responses Conditional on Financial Positions
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